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INTRODUCTION
The public first became aware of the scope and severity of the
nation's hazardous waste problem in 1978 when President Carter de-
clared a state of emergency in Love Canal, New York.' In this neigh-
borhood, "long-buried chemicals were seeping into homes and high
incidences of health effects, from headaches to birth defects were re-
I SeeWiLLIAM HARRis FRANK & TIMOTHY B. ATKESON, Superfund: Litigation and Cleanup,
16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 9 (pt. II) (June 28, 1985); Current Develpments, 16 Env't Rep. (BNA) 7
(May 3, 1985).
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ported."2 The public finally began to realize that burying hazardous
wastes was an inadequate means of disposal. Well-publicized discover-
ies in Cedar River, Iowa,3 and Valley of the Drums, Kentucky, 4 further
demonstrated that hazardous wastes could not be safely stored
underground. 5
The discovery of thousands of other dump sites rendered the haz-
ardous waste problem even more alarming. These discoveries
prompted both Congress and the Carter Administration to take ac-
tion.6 In December 1980, Congress passed the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 7
popularly known as CERCLA or Superfund, which created a fund of
$1.6 billion to help finance the enormous costs of restoring hazardous
waste sites.8
CERCLA authorizes the government9 to hold parties10 liable for
releasing hazardous substances into the environment." This liability
includes not only the expense of removing hazardous wastes, but also
the expenses of more permanent remedial actions. 12 In addition,
2 FRANK & ATRESON, supra note 1, at 1; Current Developments, supra note 1, at 7.
3 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 4 (1980), repinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY AcT OF 1980
(SUPERFUND), at 305, 311 (1983) [hereinafter A LEGISLATVE HISTORY] ("In 1978, the Cedar
River, near Charles City, Iowa, was found to contain poisons leached from a nearby dump-
site. The poisons were detected as far away as 60 miles downstream. This river and the
aquifer underlying the dump supply drinking water to 10% of the State's population.").
4 See JAN PAUL ACroN, UNDERSTANDING SUPERFUND: A PROGRESS REPORT 4-5 (Rand
Corp. 1989); see also S. REP. No. 96-848, at 4, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 3, at 311 ("[Near] Louisville, Kentucky, 17,000 drums were disposed of at a seven acre
site. Six thousand drums... were oozing toxic chemicals onto the ground. Other drums
with hazardous contents were buried in subsurface pits. The Environmental Protection
Agency identified approximately 200 organic chemicals and 30 metals in the drainage
area.").
5 See AaroN, supra note 4, at 5 (reporting that "[i]n some instances, known carcino-
gens were found in water supplies or flowing across boundaries of closed sites").
6 See FRANK & ATKESON, supra note 1, at 2 ("Love Canal became so powerful in the
national consciousness we were able to pass the superfund bill even after Carter was de-
feated, and that's an extraordinary action to do in a 'lame duck' administration." (quoting
former EPA Administrator Douglas M. Costle (first internal quotation marks omitted)));
see also AaroN, supra note 4, at I (noting that the statute was passed in the last month of the
Carter administration).
7 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)) [here-
inafter CERCLA].
8 See FRANK & ATKESON, supra note 1, at 2.
9 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (A). The authorization applies to both federal and state
governments and Indian tribes. See id. This Note uses the term "government" in referring
to these entities.
10 Id. § 9607(a). The classes of parties that the Act regulates include those that ar-
range for the disposal, treatment, or transport of hazardous substances, such as past and
present owners and operators of hazardous waste sites, transporters of hazardous sub-
stances, and waste generators. See id.
I Id. § 9607.
12 See id. §9607(a)(4).
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under section 107 of CERCLA, governments can hold parties liable
for damages to natural resources, 13 such as land, water, or wildlife,
and then use the proceeds to restore or replace those resources.' 4
Given the fragile nature of ecosystems, disasters such as Love Canal,
Cedar River, or Valley of the Drums can devastate the area's natural
resources. 15 As a result, potential liability under section 107 can be
tremendous. 16
For many years, parties largely ignored the natural resource dam-
ages provisions of CERCLA when initiating recovery litigation.17
Although the reasons for this practice are unclear, commentators
have posited that it arose from the Department of the Interior's fail-
ure to finalize until 198818 the damage assessment regulations that
section 301(c) (2) of CERCLA required. 19 After the removal of this
barrier, natural resource damages suits became "the next frontier" of
CERCLA.20 Cases such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which resulted in
a $900 million damage award, the largest single civil monetary settle-
ment in history at that time,2' suggest that the natural resource dam-
ages provisions of CERCLA are tremendously significant. This Note
focuses on one aspect of the provisions: their statute of limitations.22
When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, the statute of limita-
tions for claims against the Superfund was to expire on December 11,
1983, or three years from the date of discovery of the injury to, or loss
of, the natural resources, whichever was later.23 In 1986, Congress
amended the statute to provide a general three-year statute of limita-
tions running from the later of either the date the statute was
"promulgated" or the discovery of the injury or loss.2 4 After much
'3 Id. § 9607(a) (4) (C).
14 Id. §9607(f (1).
15 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., More Liabilities Coming Your Way: Tidal Waves and Natural Resources, ENERGY
ECONoMIsr, July 1, 1992, at 9, 9 [hereinafter More Liabilities Coming Your Way] (discussing
an unnamed settlement in New England in which the parties agreed to pay $2 million in
clean-up costs for contamination that PCB deposits in a major river and harbor had
caused, and an additional $62 million in natural resource damages for the harm to wildlife
and other resources).
17 See Duane Woodard & Michael R. Hope, Natural Resource Damage Litigation Under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 14 HAuv. EvrTL. L.
Rxv. 189, 191-93 (1990); More Liabilities Coming Your Way, supra note 16, at 9.
18 See, e.g., Woodard & Hope, supra note 17, at 192.
19 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (2).
20 More Liabilities Coming Your Way, supra note 16, at 9.
21 See Justice Dept. Announces Record $2 Billion Year for Environmental Enforcement, U.S.
Newswire, Oct. 29, 1992, available in 1992 WL 7882670.
22 See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1).
23 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982).
24 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g) (1) (1994). The statute provides in pertinent part:
[N]o action may be commenced for damages.., under this chapter, unless
that action is commenced within 3 years after the later of the following: (A)
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litigation and an unusual legislative history, the Department of the
Interior ("Interior") issued new regulations in 1994.25 For purposes
of the statute of limitations, 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e) specified that the
date on which regulations are "promulgated" under section 113 (g) (1)
of CERCLA is the date on which the revisions earn publication as a
final rule in the Federal Register.26 In effect, under section 11.91(e),
the government can bring suits for natural resource damages for
three years after the issuance of new regulations. Hence, the govern-
ment potentially could sue responsible parties, whose sites it identi-
fied, assessed, and otherwise handled years ago, to recover for
additional liability under the new regulations for as long as three years
following their issuance.
In Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Department of the Inte-
rior,27 the petitioners28 raised several procedural and substantive chal-
lenges to the 1994 regulations.29 Some of the substantive challenges
questioned the authority and validity of Interior's interpretation of
The date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release in
question. (B) The date on which regulations are promulgated under sec-
tion 9651(c) of this title.
Id.
25 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191
(D.C. Cir. 1996). The court explained that
[a]lithough the public comment period on those proposed regulations
ended in mid-July of 1991,. .. Interior had still not approved or issued final
rules by the time of the November 1992 Presidential election.
In midJanuary 1993, shortly before President Clinton's inauguration,
Interior's Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget approved
a set of Type B regulations, which differed from those proposed in April
1991, and directed a subordinate to send the document to the Office of the
Federal Register ("OFR") for publication as final regulations. The OFR re-
ceived.., these signed regulations.., on January 19, 1993, the final full
day of the Bush Administration. On January 21-just two days after the
OFR received the ["] 1993 Document, ["] and before the OFR filed the doc-
ument for public inspection-an Interior employee, at the direction of the
new acting Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget, tele-
phoned the OFR to withdraw the document .... In accordance with its
regulations and internal guidelines, the OFR stopped processing the 1993
Document ....
Id. at 1200-01.
26 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e) (1997).
27 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
28 The procedural challenges come to us through: Kennecott Utah Copper
Corporation's appeal of a summary judgment order issued by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia; a separate petition filed
by Kennecott; and petitions filed by fifteen trade associations, seven corpo-
rations, and two county sanitation districts, collectively referred to as Indus-
try Petitioners. The substantive challenges include eleven arguments
presented in petitions filed by Industry Petitioners and one argument
raised in a petition filed by the State of Montana.
Id. at 1199.
29 See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text.
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"promulgated" as applied to the statute of limitations.30 In particular,
the petitioners raised two arguments in this area. First, they argued
that section 113(g) (1) of CERCLA did not expressly authorize Inte-
rior to define the date on which the period of limitations commenced
through its interpretation of "promulgated."31 Absent this authority,
courts should not grant deference to Interior's interpretation of the
statute. Second, the petitioners argued in the alternative that even if
Interior had the authority to define "promulgated," its interpretation
failed to satisfy the two-tiered Chevron test.3 2 This test, which derives
from the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,33 provides the most common framework
for judicial review of administrative agencies' interpretation of stat-
utes.34 The test requires courts to conduct two levels of analysis to
determine: (1) whether Congress unambiguously has expressed its in-
tent in the statute itself; and (2) if this intent is not clear, whether the
agency has provided a permissible interpretation.35
Without deciding the issue of whether Interior had the authority
to define "promulgated,"36 the District of Columbia Circuit held for
the petitioners, finding that Interior's interpretation of "promul-
gated" did not satisfy step two of Chevron because it was not a reason-
able interpretation.37 Given the great potential for liability for natural
resource damages under CERCLA, the interpretation of the statute of
limitations could have significant consequences for both businesses
and the environment.38 As a result, the Kennecott Utah Copper court's
decision is an important one, worthy of further review.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 72-81.
31 See Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1209.
32 See id. The petitioners raised two objections within this argument. See infra text
accompanying notes 77-81.
33 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
34 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 512 ("Chevron has proven a highly important decision-perhaps the most
important in the field of administrative law since [Vermont Yankee]."); Laurence H. Silber-
man, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821, 822 (1990)
(referring to Chevron as a "landmark administrative opinion"); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial
Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 284 (1986) ("Chevron has quickly
become a decision of great importance, one of a small number of cases that every judge
bears in mind when reviewing agency decisions."); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2075 (1990) (calling Chevron "one of the very few
defining cases in the last twenty years of American public law"); The Supreme Court, 1994
Term-Leading Cases, 109 HARv. L. REv. 111, 299 (1995) [hereinafter Endangered Species Act
Update] (describing the Chevron decision as "infamous" and the "judicial mantra of defer-
ence to administrative agencies").
35 See infra Part III.
36 See Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1210.
37 Id. at 1211-13.
38 See supra note 16 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 21.
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Part I of this Note discusses the purpose and relevant history of
CERCLA, focusing, in particular, on the development of its statute of
limitations provisions. Part II discusses the facts and holding of Kenne-
cott Utah Copper with respect to Interior's interpretation of "promul-
gated" for purposes of CERCLA's statute of limitations. Part III
addresses the court's holding-that Interior's interpretation of
"promulgated" fails to satisfy step two of the Chevron standard.
Although this Part acknowledges that the court correctly determined
that the interpretation satisfied Chevron step one, it argues that the
court erred in holding that 43 C.F.R. § 11.91 (e) was an unreasonable
interpretation of the statute. Part IV analyzes the threshold issue that
the court failed to address-whether Interior has the authority to
make such an interpretation. The Note concludes by arguing that the
deficiencies in the court's analysis are unfortunate yet foreseeable re-
sults of the indefinite and malleable Chevron standard.
I
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTE OF LIMrrATIONs
PROVISIONS OF CERCLA
Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes federal and state officials, act-
ing as public trustees, to assess natural resource damages and to sue
responsible parties to recover such damages,39 both under CERCLA40
and section 311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,41 com-
monly known as the "Clean Water Act." The damages may include
"injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the
reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting
from [the] release" of hazardous substances. 42 Trustees may use the
funds they recover "to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
such natural resources."4 3 CERCLA defines the term "natural re-
sources" to include:
[L] and, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water
supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, held
in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise controlled by the United
States[,] ... any State or local government, any foreign government,
any Indian tribe, or, if such resources are subject to a trust restric-
don on alienation, any member of an Indian tribe.4 4
Congress granted the responsibility of promulgating regulations
governing the assessment of natural resource damages to the Presi-
39 CERCIA, supra note 7, at 2806.
40 42 U.S.C. § 9607(F) (1)-(2).
41 Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 311, 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994).
42 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (C).
43 Id. § 9607(f) (1).
44 Id. § 9601(16).
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dent,45 "who, in turn, delegated this responsibility to Interior."46 Sec-
tion 301(c) (2) requires the federal government to issue regulations
specifying "standard procedures for simplified assessments requiring
minimal field observation."47 These regulations are known as Type A
regulations. Similarly, section 301(c) (2) requires the federal govern-
ment to issue regulations, known as Type B regulations, specifying "al-
ternative protocols for conducting assessments in individual cases"
requiring more detailed evaluations. 48 The statute further provides
that "[s]uch regulations shall identify the best available procedures to
determine such damages, including both direct and indirect injury,
destruction, or loss and shall take into consideration factors includ-
ing, but not limited to, replacement value, use value, and ability of the
ecosystem or resource to recover."49
The government must review these regulations every two years
and revise them when appropriate. 50 Once a trustee determines the
amount of damages in accordance with federal regulations promul-
gated under section 301(c), the trustee's assessment enjoys a rebutta-
ble presumption of accuracy in a proceeding to recover damages from
a responsible party.51 Under the 1980 law, the statute of limitations
for claims against the Superfund expired on December 11, 1983, or
three years from the date of discovery of the injury to, or loss of, the
natural resources, whichever was later.52
In August 1986 Interior published a final rule containing the
Type B regulations for natural resource damages assessments. 53 Inte-
rior also amended the statute of limitations to read that
45 Id. § 9651 (c) (1). The responsibility includes promulgating regulations for the pur-
poses of CERCLA and the Clean Water Act's oil and hazardous substance, natural resource
damages provisions, governing the assessment of damages for natural resource injuries that
result from releases of hazardous substances or oil. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (f) (4)-(5).
46 Ohio v. United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also
infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text (discussing Ohio).
47 42 U.S.C. § 9651 (c) (2).
48 Id
49 Id.
50 See id. §9651(c) (3).
51 See id. § 9607(f) (2) (C).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (1982).
53 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 27,674, 27,726-27 (1986)
(codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (Aug. 1, 1986). The damage assessment process that the
Natural Resource Damage Assessment regulations established has several phases. In the
"Preassessment phase," a trustee initially determines whether the release of hazardous sub-
stances or oil has affected natural resources. 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.25 (1997). If the trustee
determines that further action is necessary, he devises an assessment strategy in the "Assess-
ment Plan phase." Id. §§ 11.30-.35. Next, he implements the "Type B Procedures," id.
§ 11.60, and determines whether the natural resources suffered an injury ("Injury Determi-
nation phase"), id. §§ 11.61-.64, quantifies this injury ("Quantification phase"), id.
§§ 11.70-.73, and determines the monetary damages ("Damage Assessment phase"), id.
§ 11.80-.84. Finally, in the "Post-assessment phase," the trustee documents the assessment
process and demands payment from the responsible party. Id. §§ 11.90-.93.
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no claim may be presented under this section... unless the claim is
presented within 3 years after the later of the following: (A) [t]he
date of the discovery of the loss and its connection with the release
in question[; or] (B) [t]he date on which final regulations are
promulgated under section 9651(c) of this title.54
The Conference Report for the amendment suggests that Interior
adopted these changes to the statute of limitations
"because the ability of Federal and state trustees to pursue such
claims and actions has been impaired by the failure of the President
to promulgate regulations .... These amendments are intended to
revive causes of action [and claims] for natural resource damages
that may have been foreclosed by the running of the statute of limi-
tations ....- 55
State governments, environmental groups, industrial corpora-
tions, and an industry group promptly challenged the August 1986
regulations.56 The District of Columbia Circuit consolidated these
and later challenges57 in Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior.58
The Ohio court granted a petition for review with respect to two of the
Type B regulations,5 9 and remanded a third to the agency.60 The
54 42 U.S.C. § 9612(d) (2) (Supp. IV 1987).
55 Claire Whitney, Natural Resource Damages, in SUPERFUND: THE 1986 AMENDMENTS
505, 511 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 315, 1986) (alteration
in original) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 223 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3124, 3316).
56 The parties in Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir.
1989), included, among others, the states of Ohio, NewJersey, Colorado, New York, Massa-
chusetts, and California, and the National Wildlife Federation, the Chemical Manufactur-
ers Association, the Public Service Electric and Gas Co., and the Dana Corporation. Ohio,
880 F.2d at 432-33. Intervenors included Public Service Electric and Gas Co., ASARCO
Inc., Edison Electric Institute, American Mining Congress, Chemical Manufacturers Associ-
ation, American Petroleum Institute, and the National Wildlife Federation. See id.
57 In October 1986 Congress adopted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act ("SARA"), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675
(1994)), amending CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions in several ways. See id.
at 438-40. Interior then issued revised rules in February 1988 in response to SARA. See id.
at 440. These revised rules faced subsequent challenges from a state government and an
environmental group. See id.
58 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
59 Id. at 439-40, 442 (ruling that the regulation limiting damages recoverable by gov-
ernment trustees for harmed natural resources to the lesser of the cost of restoring or
replacing the equivalent of the injured resource, or to the lost use value of the resource,
was contrary to clearly expressed intent of Congress); id. at 464 (holding that the regula-
tion prescribing the hierarchy of methodologies used to measure the lost use value of
natural resources, that focused exclusively on market values for such resources when mar-
ket values were available and appropriate, was not a reasonable interpretation of
CERCLA).
60 Id. at 461 (remanding the record to Interior for clarification of its interpretation of
its own regulations concerning applicability of CERCLA natural resource damages provi-
sions to privately owned land that was under the management or control of federal, state,
or local governments).
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court instructed Interior to proceed with issuing new regulations in
conformity with the opinion "as expeditiously as possible."61 In re-
sponse, Interior proposed new regulations in April 1991 that left most
of the prior rules in place, but changed specific sections to address the
concerns of the Ohio court.62 Due to the change in administrations
following the 1992 presidential election, Interior never formally is-
sued revised rules.63
In July 1993, Interior reopened the public comment period for
the April 1991 regulations and suggested further revisions.64 In
March 1994, Interior issued final regulations. 65 These regulations
provided that
the date on which regulations are promulgated under section
301 (c) of CERCLA is the date on which the later'of the revisions to
the type A rule and the type B rule, pursuant to State of Colorado v.
United States Department of the Interior, 880 F.2d 481 (D.C. Cir. 1989),
and [Ohio], is published as a final rule in the FEDERAL REGISTER. 6 6
The 1994 regulations were the subject of the challenges in Kennecott
Utah Copper.67 This Note focuses on the challenges to the statute of
limitations provision.
II
K)UWM COTr UTA-M COPPER CoRP. v Uz-ED STAYES
DEPARTMENT OF TI-E INTAIO.R
In Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Department of the Inte-
rior, the petitioners challenged the validity of the 1994 regulations on
both procedural and substantive grounds. 68 The procedural chal-
lenges questioned the methods that Interior had used in issuing the
regulations. 69 The substantive challenges claimed that the regulations
not only exceeded the agency's authority under CERCLA and the
Clean Water Act, but also constituted arbitrary and capricious ac-
61 Id. at 481.
62 See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752, 19,767-73 (1991)
(codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11) (Apr. 29, 1991).
63 See supra note 25.
64 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1201 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
65 See id.
66 Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e) (1997) (citation
omitted).
67 Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1199.
68 Id. The Kennecott Utah Copper decision did not include the facts of the underlying
dispute and these facts apparently had no bearing on the decision. The case derived from
eight disputes in the lower court.
69 See id. at 1201-09.
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don.70 Three of these substantive challenges concerned the statute of
limitations provision in 43 C.F.R. § 11.91 (e). 71
In the first of the three challenges to the statute of limitations
provision, the petitioners argued that Congress had not authorized
Interior to define the term "promulgated" within the meaning of sec-
tion 113(g) (1) (B). 72 They claimed "that nothing in [section] 301(c)
of the GERCLA expressly authorizes Interior to set the period of limi-
tation."73 Rather, they argued that because the statute of limitations
"control [led] the business of the courts, the resolution of any ambigu-
ity in the statute [was] implicitly entrusted to the judicial branch."74
They maintained that it would be highly unusual for Congress to have
granted Interior this authority because Interior was frequently a plain-
tiff asserting natural resource damages claims.75
In the second and third challenges, the petitioners argued that
Interior's interpretation of "promulgated" did not survive either step
of the Chevron standard for statutory interpretation. 76 They claimed
that the interpretation did not satisfy step one because "Congress
[had] directly spoken to the precise question at issue. '77 The petition-
ers argued that the meaning of "promulgated" was plain on its face. 78
Therefore, Interior lacked the authority-assuming that it had inter-
pretive authority concerning the statute of limitations provision in the
first instance-to provide its own interpretation of this term.79 Alter-
natively, the petitioners argued that Interior's interpretation was not a
permissible one under step two of Chevron because it "[was] neither
reasonable nor consistent with the purpose of the statute."80
A. Interior's Authority to Define "Promulgated" Within
Section l13(g) (1) (B) of CERCLA
Addressing the authority issue first, the court acknowledged that
it was a "close call" as to whether Congress had authorized Interior to
define "promulgated" as the agency did in 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e).81
Rather than further analyzing this issue, the court "assume [d] without
deciding" that Interior had the authority to make such an interpreta-
70 See Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1202 (stating that petitioners raised eleven
substantive challenges).
71 See id at 1209.
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See id.
76 See id. at 1209, 1210-13.
77 Id. at 1210 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
78 See id. at 1211.
79 See id.
80 Id.
81 Id at 1210.
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tion.82 The court determined that it was unnecessary to decide the
authority issue because 43 C.F.R § 11.91(e) was invalid under Chevron
regardless of whether Interior had the authority to define "promul-
gated. 83 As the court stated, "In light of our conclusion that the De-
partment's interpretation of 'promulgate' cannot survive even with
the aid of Chevron deference,... we need not resolve whether Interior
[was] in fact entitled to that deference. 84
B. The Validity of Interior's Interpretation
Proceeding on the assumption that Interior had the authority to
define "promulgated" and therefore was entitled to Chevron defer-
ence, the court applied the Chevron standard to 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e).8 5
Although the court concluded that the interpretation satisfied step
one of Chevron because Congress had not addressed this issue di-
rectly,8 6 the court nevertheless struck down the interpretation by hold-
ing that it was not "reasonable" under step two.8 7
1. The Court's Application of Chevron Step One
The first step of Chevron requires that courts and agencies deter-
mine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue."88 If so, then interpretations "must give effect to the unambigu-
ously expressed intent of Congress. '89 The petitioners argued that 43
C.F.R. § 11.91 (e) could not meet this step for three reasons: "(1) [sec-
tion] 113(g) (1) (B) expressly provides that damage claims are barred
if filed more than three years after Interior promulgated its regula-
tions under [section] 301(c); and (2) those regulations were promul-
gated in 1986 and 1987; and (3) the term 'promulgated' is
unambiguous."90 In other words, they argued that Congress had used
the term "promulgated" in a clear and unambiguous manner that was
inconsistent with Interior's subsequent interpretation. 9 '
To determine whether "promulgated" had an unambiguous
meaning, the court examined past uses of the term and "the extent to
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 1212.
86 Id. at 1211.
87 Id- at 1212.
88 Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
89 Id. at 842-43.
90 Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1209.
91 See id. at 1211 (stating the petitioners' argument to be "that the statute is plain on
its face," and does not support Interior's "view that a regulation is not promulgated until it
has been judicially challenged, revised by the agency as necessary, and become final in the
sense that there is no further possibility of judicially-mandated revision").
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which those who must apply it have encountered interpretive difficul-
ties."92 The court attempted to determine whether it was "apparent,
for example, that a rule is promulgated when it is issued or formally
announced by an agency,"93 "filed with the Office of the Federal Regis-
ter,"94 "[o]r published in the Federal Register."95 After reviewing several
opinions in which courts had interpreted the word "promulgated" in
various ways, 96 the Kennecott Utah Copper court concluded that the term
was "far from unambiguous" and, therefore, that Congress had not
addressed the meaning of "promulgated" directly in sec-
tion 113(g) (1) (B).9 7 After determining that the agency's interpreta-
tion satisfied step one of Chevron, the court proceeded to test the
interpretation's validity under step two.
2. The Court's Application of Chevron Step Two
When a statute is ambiguous, the second step of Chevron requires
courts to assume that Congress delegated to the agency the power to
make policy choices that "represent[ ] a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies that were committed to the agency's care by the
statute."98
The petitioners argued that, even if the statute was ambiguous,
Interior's interpretation was not permissible under step two of Chevron
because it would authorize Interior to postpone indefinitely the limi-
tations period simply by delaying its promulgation of the regula-
tions.99 Interior argued that its interpretation was permissible despite
this potential for delay because the regulations did not provide a
method for calculating damages prior to the 1994 revisions.100 In the
absence of these final damage assessment regulations, trustees could
not take advantage of CERCLA's rebuttable presumption. 10' There-
fore, Interior argued that 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e)
further[ed] a purpose of the CERCLA by preserving for public
trustees the ability to initiate litigation until three years after final
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. (italics added).
95 Id. (italics added).
96 See id. (discussing National Grain & Feed Ass'n, Inc. v. OSIHA, 845 F.2d 345 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); United Techs. Corp. v. OS{A, 836 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Montrose Chem. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd sub nom. California v.
Montrose Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Seattle, 33 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1549 (W.D. Wash. 1991)).
97 Id. at 1211.
98 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845
(1984) (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 383 (1961)).
99 See Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1211-12.
100 See id. at 1212.
101 See id.
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and valid regulations have been promulgated. Only with final regu-
lations in place... can a trustee who elects to follow the regulations
be assured that he can prosecute a damage action under § 301 (c)
armed with the rebuttable presumption that the Congress made
available.' 0 2
The court rejected Interior's argument and held that the
agency's interpretation of "'promulgate [d]' . . . l[ay] beyond the
bounds of the permissible."'01 3 Although the court acknowledged that
there may be some uncertainty about the precise date upon which an
agency promulgates a regulation, it concluded:
[I] t is surely either the date of issuance or other formal announce-
ment by the agency, the date of filing with the Office of the Federal
Register, or the date of publication in the Federal Register.... For
an agency to so stretch the word "promulgate" that a regulation
might not be deemed promulgated until several years after the last
of these events is simply not a reasonable attribution of intent to the
Congress.' 0 4
In reaching this conclusion, the court placed emphasis on the pur-
pose of statutes of limitation to "grant repose to potential defendants,
protecting them from the prejudice and uncertainty that can occur
when a plaintiff files its claims only after an extended time."10 5
The court dismissed Interior's claim that trustees would face un-
due prejudice unless the court enforced the provisions of 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.91 (e). 0 6 The court reasoned that before the Ohio v. United States
Department of the Interior decision, a trustee could have followed the
then-existing Type B regulations.10 7 "Since that decision, a trustee has
had three choices, none of which would run afoul of the limitation
period."'08 First, a trustee could have followed the 1986 version of the
regulations with any changes that would have made them consistent
with the requirements of Ohio.109 Second, a trustee could have filed
his damage claim, but requested a stay of the action until Interior had
issued the revised rules. 110 Finally, a trustee could have gone forward
with the action, despite the lack of damage assessment guidelines, and
have lost the advantage of the rebuttable presumption."' The court
concluded that there was no prejudice "that would justify exposing
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1211.
106 Id. at 1212.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See id.
110 Se id.
111 Se id.
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defendants to the endless prospect of litigation for alleged infractions
many years or even decades past."' 1 2
Therefore, the court held that even if Interior had the authority
to define "promulgated" in section 113 (g) (1) (B), the interpretation
that the agency provided in 43 C.F.R. § 11.91 (e) was unreasonable or
"beyond the bounds of the permissible."" 3 The court concluded that
the latest date that the regulations were "promulgated" under section
301 (c) was the date that the Type A regulations earned publication in
the Federal Register in 1987.114
III
TH COURT'S HOLDING: ANALYsIs AND APPLICATION
OF CHEVRON
The Chevron standard of statutory interpretation is comprised of
three distinct questions. The first or threshold question asks whether
Congress has delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statu-
tory provision at issue. 115 If Congress has not done so, either explicitly
or implicitly, then the court must determine the validity of the inter-
pretation using standard tools of statutory interpretation."16 If Con-
gress has granted the agency authority to interpret the statute, the
court must apply the two remaining questions, which some commen-
tators and courts have deemed the Chevron two-step, to determine
whether the interpretation is valid.117 Because the two remaining
questions grant a greater degree of deference to the interpretation
than would standard methods of statutory interpretation, 1 8 the
threshold determination of authority is an important part of the Chev-
ron analysis.
The first of the two remaining questions, popularly termed Chev-
ron "step one," asks "whether Congress has directly spoken to the pre-
cise question at issue."" 9 If congressional intent is clear from the
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1213.
115 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d
1100, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
Chevron ... is premised on the notion that Congress implicitly delegated to
the agency the authority to reconcile reasonably statutory ambiguities or to
fill reasonably statutory interstices. Where Congress does not give an
agency authority to determine.., the interpretation of a statute in the first
instance .... deference to the agency's interpretation is inappropriate.
Id.
116 See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co., 494 U.S. at 649-50.
117 See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204. 212-13 (1988); NLRB v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987).
118 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984).
119 Id. at 842.
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statutory language, then the agency's interpretation is invalid to the
extent that it conflicts with that intent. 120 If congressional intent is
not clear, then the court must apply the second question-Chevron
"step two.' 21
Step two requires the court to examine the agency's interpreta-
tion to determine its validity.122 The level of scrutiny that the court
must apply to the agency's interpretation depends on whether Con-
gress's delegation of authority had been explicit or implicit.123 As the
Chevron Court stated, "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency
to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation."'124 In
this case, the reviewing court must uphold the agency's interpretation
of the statute unless this interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute."'125 In contrast, if the delegation of
authority to the agency had been implicit, which is generally the case
when the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue,
the court must determine whether the agency's interpretation rests on
a "permissible"'126 or "reasonable"'127 construction of the statute. If the
interpretation satisfies both step one and step two, the court must ac-
cept the agency's construction of the statute. 128
Because the Kennecott Utah Copper court assumed that Interior had
the authority to interpret "promulgated" within the natural resource
damages provisions of CERCLA, the court's holding and analysis fo-
cused on whether the interpretation was valid under the highly defer-
ential Chevron standard.' 29 It is therefore appropriate to initiate the
analysis of Kennecott Utah Copper by discussing the requirements of
steps one and two of Chevron and reviewing the court's application of
these steps to that case. For the purposes of this discussion, this Part
will adopt the court's assumption that Interior had the authority to
define "promulgated" within the natural resource damages provisions
of CERCLA.' 30
120 See id. at 842-43.
121 Id. at 843.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 843-44.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 844.
126 Id. at 843.
127 Id. at 844.
128 See id. at 843-45.
129 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
130 For a discussion of whether Interior had this authority, see infra Part IV.
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A. Chevron Step One: Clarity of Congressional Intent
After an agency has interpreted the meaning of a term or section
of a statute, the court, in applying Chevron step one, must determine
whether Congress already has defined that term or section clearly.' 3 '
If the court determines that the words and purpose of the statute do
not provide an unambiguous definition of the term or section, the
court must follow congressional intent and invalidate any conflicting
agency interpretations. 132 The rationale behind this step derives from
the constitutional theory of separation of powers.'33 Ideally because
Article III of the Constitution grants the legislative branch the ulti-
mate power to write the laws of the country, interpretations that the
executive or judicial branches make must conform to the intent of
Congress.134 As the Chevron Court stated, "If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress." 13 5
In determining congressional intent, the reviewing court must
employ traditional tools of statutory construction. 136 A thorough dis-
cussion of the many tools of statutory construction is beyond the
scope of this Note. Suffice it to say that in recent Supreme Court cases
that have implemented Chevron, the Court has utilized numerous tools
131 See supra text accompanying note 119.
132 See supra text accompanying note 120.
'33 See Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
134 See id.; see also 3 CHESTER JAMES AmTEAu & WILLIAM J. RICH, MODERN CONSTIT-
TiONAL LAw §§ 47.03-.05 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing legislative and executive delegation, and
judicial review of interpretations resulting from such delegation); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CoNSTITrioNAL LAw §§ 3-1 to -3 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the derivation of
judicial power to interpret and enforce the Constitution).
135 Chevron, U.S.A Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984). The Court added that "[t]hejudiciary is the final authority on issues of statu-
tory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent." Id. at 843 n.9.
136 See id. ("If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law
and must be given effect."); see also NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union,
484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) ("On a pure question of statutory construction, our first job is to
try to determine congressional intent, using 'traditional tools of statutory construction.' If
we can do so, then that interpretation must be given effect, and the regulations at issue
must be fully consistent with it."); Continenta, 843 F.2d at 1448 (noting that "our employ-
ment of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation has left us in doubt as to what
Congress had in mind on the precise issue at hand"); Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency
Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 18-19 (1990) (stating
that under Chevron step one, the court may use "traditional tools of statutory construction"
to determine congressional intent (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9)).
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including the plain language of the statute,8 7 legislative history, 38
the statute's relationship with other laws,'8 9 and the structure or con-
text of the statute. 140 Although certain Justices appear to prefer the
plain meaning tool,14 1 there is no consensus among courts or com-
mentators as to which tools courts should use in Chevron step one to
interpret statutes.' 42 It is similarly unclear what level of scrutiny the
courts should accord when employing these tools. The generally ac-
cepted, but nevertheless vague, standard is that the court should re-
view the statute with enough vigor to determine whether there is a
clear congressional intent regarding the issue.143 This vigor, however,
should not create intent when it is otherwise ambiguous. 4 4
Furthermore, it is unclear how much ambiguity warrants labelling
a term "ambiguous," thus triggering Chevron step two. 145 Justice Scalia
proposed that "congressional intent must be regarded as 'ambiguous'
• . . when two or more reasonable, though not necessarily equally
valid, interpretations exist."1 46 He argued that in requiring courts to
137 See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 642-43 (1990); Public Employees
Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989); United Food & Commercial Workers, 484
U.S. at 124, 128, 130; INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432-33 (1987).
138 See, e.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 399 n.6 (1996); United Food &
Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. at 129-30; Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432-33; see also Scalia,
supra note 34, at 518 (acknowledging the importance of legislative history and stating that
the history of agency action is also important because "the existence of a 'long-standing,
consistent agency interpretation' that dates to the original enactment of the statute...
may be part of the evidence showing that the statute is in fact not ambiguous but has a
clearly defined meaning").
139 See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 438-40.
140 See, e.g., United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. at 124, 128-30.
141 See Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 410-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (criticizing the majority's failure to consider fully the plain
language of the statute); Scalia, supra note 34, at 521 (characterizing himself as one who
favors the plain meaning rule).
142 This uncertainty is arguably a weakness of Chevron step one. See Endangered Species
Act Update, supra note 34, at 304-05 (arguing that by choosing certain tools of statutory
construction that favor the desirable result, courts can use Chevron to make policy
judgments).
143 See Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 410-11 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); Anthony, supra note 136, at 18-19.
144 See RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpre-
tations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAD. L. REv. 301, 308 (1988). According to Pierce, a
court should refrain from teasing meaning from the statute's ambiguous or
conflicting language and legislative history; it should eschew the process of
'creative" statutory interpretation that is otherwise essential and appropri-
ate in judicial decision making.... If the process of "real" statutory inter-
pretation does not produce a determination that Congress resolved the
specific issue, the court is dealing with a policy decision made by an agency.
Id.
145 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2091-93.
146 Scalia, supra note 34, at 520.
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determine if the "intent of Congress is clear,"'147 Chevron "suggests that
the opposite of 'ambiguity' is not 'resolvability,' but rather 'clar-
ity." 1 48 Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, proposed that congres-
sional intent was unclear if it was "arguably ambiguous."'149 Finally,
Justice Ginsburg indicated that intent was unclear if it was "not an
inevitable .. .construction" of the statute. 150 The difficulty lies in
setting the ambiguity threshold high enough to ensure that step one is
more than a rubber-stamp procedure, but low enough to ensure that
courts do not manufacture congressional intent impermissibly. 151
Despite the inherent difficulties in applying Chevron step one,
courts usually find that the agency interpretation satisfies this step. 152
In a non-Chevron case, one in which deference to the agency interpre-
tation is inappropriate, the court interprets the statute itself without
deferring to the agency.15  Under Chevron, however, the court must
proceed to step two to evaluate the agency's interpretation. 154
In Kennecott Utah Copper, the petitioners urged the court to apply
the plain meaning rule, arguing that the meaning of "promulgated"
147 Chevron U.SA Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
148 Scalia, supra note 34, at 520. Justice Scalia acknowledged, however, that his ten-
dency to find that the meaning of a statute is clear from its language and its relationship
with other laws leads him to invalidate a greater number of suits at step one. Id. at 521.
149 K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 293 n.4 (1988). But see Sunstein, supra
note 34, at 2091 (observing that "It] he Court's own decisions... suggest that the mere fact
of a plausible alternative view is insufficient to trigger the Chevron rule").
150 Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 401-03 (1996) (rejecting the petitioner's
argument that Congress had intended catching and loading broiler chickens to qualify as
work performed "on a farm as an incident to" the raising of poultry under section 3(f) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, because such an interpretation is "a plausible, but
not an inevitable, construction of [the statute]").
151 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 520 (stating that "Chevron becomes virtually meaningless
... if ambiguity exists only when the arguments for and against the various possible inter-
pretations are in absolute equipoise"); cf Holly Farms, 517 U.S. at 410 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing pre-Chevron precedent for
the proposition that "blind adherence to [agency interpretations] when [they are] directly
contrary to the plain language of the relevant statute" is unacceptable); Sunstein, supra
note 34, at 2091 (explaining that "[ihf any ambiguity triggers the deference rule-if the
agency wins whenever a reasonable person could be persuaded that more than one inter-
pretation exists-the principle will be extraordinarily broad").
152 See Pierce, supra note 144, at 306-07.
In a high proportion of cases .... an honest analysis of the language, the
congressional goals, and the legislative history of the statute will not sup-
port a holding that Congress actually resolved the policy issue presented to
the court. This situation often arises because Congress frequently uses am-
biguous or conflicting statutory language and invariably promulgates incon-
sistent congressional goals.
Id. (footnote omitted).
153 See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990).
154 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984); see Anthony, supra note 136, at 18-19.
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was clear on its face. 155 They argued that the plain meaning of the
word-in their view, to publish or announce officially-supported
their argument that the statute was "promulgated" in 1986 and 1987,
when Interior had published the Type B and Type A regulations in
the Federal Register.156 The court, however, did not adopt the plain
meaning rule. Instead, the court "look[ed] to the manner in which
[the term 'promulgated'] ha[d] been used and the extent to which
those who must apply it have encountered interpretive difficulties.' 157
First, the court pointed to two instances in which another panel of the
D.C. Circuit 158 and Interior159 had stated that the 1986 and 1987 regu-
lations were "promulgated." Acknowledging that these statements evi-
denced prior consensus between the court and the agency on this
issue, the court nevertheless determined that such statements were
not dispositive because they did not prove that the word itself was
unambiguous. 160
Second, at Interior's urging, the court reviewed two other cases,
United States v. Montrose Chemical Corp.'61 and United States v. Seattle,162
in which the respective district courts had struggled to interpret
"promulgated" under section 113(g) (1) (B).163 Although the court
did not discuss these opinions in detail, it appeared to acknowledge
that defining "promulgated" was a difficult task.'6 Finally, the court
briefly mentioned a D.C. Circuit case 165 that had arisen under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 ("OSHA"), 16 6 in which the
155 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
156 See id. at 1210-11. The petitioners pointed to the definition of "'promulgate'" in
Black s Law Dictionary as support. Id. at 1211 (citing B.ACK'S LAW DI-rIoNARY 1093 (5th ed.
1979)).
157 Id.
158 Id. (describing the 1987 Type A regulation as " 'promulgated ... in compliance
with the statutory requirements'" of section 301(c) of CERCLA (quoting Colorado v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 481, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (omission in
original))).
159 Id. (referring to both the 1987 Type A regulations and the 1986 Type B regulations,
and stating that "'[t]he Department ... has promulgated various final rules for the assess-
ment of damages for injuries to natural resources'" (quoting Natural Resource Damage
Assessments, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,752, 19,754 (1991) (alteration and omission in original))).
160 Id.
161 883 F. Supp. 1396, 1402 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd sub nom. California v. Montrose
Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the argument that section 9613(g)
is clear on its face).
162 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1549, 1550 (W.D. Wash. 1991) (holding that the statute
of limitations for both the Type A and Type B regulations had not begun to run until the
Type A regulations earned publication on March 20, 1987).
163 Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1211.
164 See id.
165 National Grain & Feed Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA, 845 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
166 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678
(1994)).
1998] 1401
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
court unenthusiastically had held that the date of promulgation of the
relevant regulation had been the date that the OSHA standard had
earned publication in the Federal Register-"at least in the absence of a
valid OSHA regulation fixing some other date."'1 67 The Kennecott Utah
Copper court concluded that this "opinion... [had] suggest[ed] that
the term 'promulgated,' as [had been] used in 29 U.S.C. § 655(f),
[had been] far from unambiguous. ' 168 Based on the above analysis,
the court held that the term "promulgated" in section l13 (g) (1) (B)
of CERCLA was ambiguous. 169 Because it determined that congres-
sional intent was not clear from the face of the statute, the court held
that Interior's interpretation survived step one of Chevron.
The court reviewed four cases to reach the conclusion that 43
C.F.R. § 11.91(e) satisfied Chevron step one.' 70 The court relied on
these authorities to overcome evidence that the plain language of the
statute and past statements of the court and the agency had defined
"promulgated" as the date of publication in the Federal Register.17'
Although, as discussed below, a more vigorous review of the language,
history, and application of the statute supports this conclusion, the
court failed to approach this issue with such vigor.
The court also found that the term was ambiguous because sev-
eral interpretations were possible. 172 The court raised the questions,
"Is it apparent, for example, that a rule is promulgated when it is is-
sued or formally announced by an agency? Or must the rule be filed
with the Office of the Federal Register? Or published in the Federal Reg-
ister?"'73 The cases on which the court relied to find ambiguity 74 pro-
vide little, if any, support for this conclusion. The court in National
Grain & Feed Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA7 5 held that "an OSHA standard is
promulgated on the date that it is published in the Federal Register."'1 76
Although dicta in the opinion intimated that "the date of issuance"
might be sufficient, the court was unwilling to accept this interpreta-
tion in the absence of a valid OSHA regulation. 77 The Seattle and
Montrose cases both addressed whether "promulgation of regulations"
referred to the Type B or Type A regulations. The Seattle court held
that the regulations were not "promulgated" until both the Type A
167 National Grain, 845 F.2d at 346.
168 Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1211.
169 Id.
170 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
171 See Kennecott Utah Copper, 88 F.3d at 1210-11.
172 Id. at 1211.
173 Id. (italics added).
174 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
'75 845 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
176 Id. at 346 (italics added).
177 Id.
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and Type B regulations appeared in the Federal Register.178 The Mont-
rose court disagreed with the Seattle decision, concluding that although
the statute was not clear, the better reading was that "promulgation"
occurred when the earlier Type B regulations earned publication. 179
Although these two courts clearly disagreed about the meaning of
"regulations," they did not question that "promulgated" meant "pub-
lished.'u80 In other words, the weight of evidence before the Kennecott
Utah Copper court, including those cases that the court cited to support
its position, had pointed toward "publication" as the definition of
"promulgation." It appears that the Kennecott Utah Copper court de-
cided that the term was ambiguous on the ground that the term
"promulgated" could have several possible meanings. Although this
impression might satisfy justice Kennedy's "arguably ambiguous" stan-
dard 18' orJustice Ginsburg's "not an inevitable... construction" stan-
dard, 8 2 it likely would fall to satisfy Justice Scalia's "reasonable
interpretation" standard. 8 3
The question then is whether the Kennecott Utah Copper court, de-
spite the deficiencies in its analysis, reached the correct conclusion in
holding that Interior's interpretation of "promulgated" satisfied Chev-
ron step one. In determining Congress's intent in using the term
"promulgated" in section 113 (g) (1) (B), two issues arise. First, what
agency actions constitute promulgation under the Act? The court
proposed several alternatives, including publication of the regulation
in the Federal Register, the agency's issuance or formal announcement
of the regulation, or the act of filing the regulation with the Office of
the Federal Register.18 4 The court based its holding that Interior's regu-
lation satisfied step one of Chevron on the conclusion that congres-
sional intent regarding this first issue was ambiguous. 85 The second
issue is whether the promulgation of an amendment or revision, ac-
cepting one of the previous definitions of "promulgated," represents
promulgation of the regulation itself under section 113(g) (1) (B).
Perhaps because the court found ambiguity in the first issue,186 it con-
cluded that it did not need to address this second issue in its Chevron
step one analysis.
178 United States v. Seattle, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1549, 1550-51 (W.D. Wash.
1991).
179 United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 883 F. Supp. 1396, 1398-1402 (C.D. Cal.
1995), rev'd sub nom. California v. Montrose Chem. Corp., 104 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1997).
180 See Montros4 883 F. Supp. at 1398-1402; Seattle, 33 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1549.
181 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 146-48 and accompanying text
184 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 1210-11.
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Although traditional tools of statutory interpretation point to the
date of initial publication in the Federal Register as the most common
definition of "promulgated," the court was correct in determining that
congressional intent regarding the first issue was unclear. The plain
meaning of "promulgation" connotes the act of making a rule gener-
ally known. Black's Law Dictionay defines "promulgate" as "[t] o pub-
lish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory.
The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court."' 87 Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary defines "promulgate" as "to make known by
open declaration: proclaim; to make known or public the terms of (a
proposed law); to put (a law) into action or force."' 88 Although one
could argue that an agency makes a rule generally known by publish-
ing it in the Federal Register, announcing the rule to the general public
through the media likely would have the same effect.
Congressional intent also seems ambiguous in light of prior judi-
cial interpretations of the term. Although courts generally have
found that promulgation meant publication in the Federal Register, few
opinions have held so without qualification. 8 9 For example, in Amei-
can Mining Congress v. Thomas,190 the Tenth Circuit stated that the date
that an agency has promulgated a regulation was generally the date of
publication in the Federal Register.191 The court, however, acknowl-
edged that the term "does not have a single accepted meaning in all
contexts.... At least one meaning of promulgate is to make pub-
lic."192 Based on this reasoning, the American Mining Congress court
held that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had promul-
gated a regulation under the Atomic Energy Act on the date that the
EPA Administrator had signed the final regulations and had made
them available to the public.' 93
Unfortunately, the legislative history of CERCLA provides no fur-
ther guidance regarding Congress's intended meaning of "promul-
gated." The legislative history does not discuss the meaning of this
word or, in particular, its meaning with respect to the statute of limita-
187 BLAcK's LAw DIcIONARY 1214 (6th ed. 1990).
188 WEBSTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DICrIoNARY 922 (8th ed. 1977).
189 See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text; see also Northwest Envtl. Defense Ctr.
v. Brennen, 958 F.2d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that "promulgation" means "publi-
cation" because that is the point at which the public generally would learn of regulation);
United Techs. Corp. v. OSHA, 836 F.2d 52, 53-54 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding that "promulga-
tion" is "publication" in the Federal Register because this term is juxtaposed with "issued,"
which must have a different meaning); Sea Watch Int'l v. Mosbacher, 762 F. Supp. 370,
374-75 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that "promulgation" is "publication," rather than "filing," in
the Federal Register under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act).
190 772 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1985).
191 Id. at 645.
192 Id.
193 Id.
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tions provision. 19 4 This omission is unfortunate, although not unex-
pected, given that courts generally have regarded the legislative
history of CERCLA as inadequate. 19 5 Studying the term in the context
of the nearby language in the statute is similarly unhelpful because
"promulgated" is not surrounded by any words that clarify its
meaning.
As for the second issue, it is also unclear whether Congress in-
tended the date of promulgation of amendments or revisions under
CERCLA to serve as the date of promulgation of the regulations them-
selves for purposes of the statute of limitations. The legislative history
does not indicate that Congress considered this issue when drafting
the statute. 19 6 In addition, no court-including the Kennecott Utah
Copper court-has addressed this issue directly. Some courts have
questioned whether the date of promulgation of the initial Type A
regulations had tolled the statute of limitations for the earlier Type B
regulations. 19 7 Other courts have questioned the level of finality that
is necessary for the promulgation of a regulation. 19 8 Although these
opinions shed some light on this issue, they clearly are not dispositive"
as to whether the date of promulgation of amendments serves as the
date of promulgation of the regulations under section 113(g) (1) (B).
In this instance, the only tool of statutory interpretation that pro-
vides some guidance regarding congressional intent is the method of
interpreting the term within the context of the broader statute. This
method, however, also poses problems because different sections of
the statute provide different meanings for "promulgated." For exam-
ple, in section 301(c) (1), the statute states that the President "shall
promulgate regulations for the assessment" of natural resource dam-
ages and that these regulations should be promulgated "not later than
6 months after October 17, 1986."199 "Promulgate," within this con-
194 See 1-3 A LEGISLATIE HIsTORY, supra note 3.
195 See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985) (stating that
the statute "has acquired a well-deserved notoriety for vaguely-drafted provisions and an
indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative history"); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music Ltd., 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1223, 1224 (D. Ariz. 1984) (referring to the legislative history of
CERCLA as "sketchy" or "non-exist[e]nt"); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem.
Co., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1401, 1414 n.15 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (stating that "CERCLA is
... a hastily drawn piece of compromise legislation, marred by vague terminology and
deleted provisions"); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (not-
ing that the legislative history of CERCLA is "unusually riddled by self-serving and contra-
dictory statements"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111
(D. Minn. 1982) (discussing "last minute" additions to CERCLA during its passage through
Congress, and noting that "the Committee Reports must be read with some caution").
196 See 1-3 A LEGISLATIVE HisroR, supra note 3.
197 See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., Municipal Auth. v. EPA, 945 F.2d 67, 71-73 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the
EPA's conditional approval of individual control strategies does not constitute
promulgation).
199 CERCLA, supra note 7, at 2805 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c)(1) (1994)).
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text, appears to refer to a one-time event that occurs when the agency
initially releases the regulations. Other sections, such as section
102(a),200 separate "promulgate" from terms such as "revise." The
separation and juxtaposition of these terms indicate that Congress did
not intend for courts to treat an amendment or revision as a "promul-
gation." Other sections, however, fail to make this distinction. For
example, section 105 (c) (1) states that the President may "promulgate
amendments to the hazard ranking system."20 1 In that provision, the
statute directly states that an amendment can be "promulgated." Fur-
thermore, section 155(a) discusses both "promulgation" and
"repromulgation."20 2 Hence, the context of the statute provides
strong support for arguments on both sides of the issue.
In conclusion, the Kennecott Utah Copper court correctly found
that the term "promulgated," for the purposes of section
113(g) (1) (B) of CERCLA, was ambiguous. Regardless of whether a
court applies Justice Scalia's "reasonable interpretation" standard, or
Justice Kennedy's orJustice Ginsburg's less rigorous standards, 203 vig-
orous application of the traditional tools of statutory construction in-
dicates that the intent of Congress is unclear on this issue. Therefore,
the court was correct in holding that 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e) satisfied
step one of Chevron.
B. Chevron Step Two: Reasonableness of the Agency
Interpretation
Once the reviewing court determines that congressional intent
regarding the issue in question is ambiguous under Chevron step one,
it must evaluate the agency interpretation under Chevron step two. 20 4
According to Chevron, the level of scrutiny that the court must accord
the agency's interpretation depends on whether Congress's delega-
tion of authority to the agency was explicit or implicit.205 If the dele-
gation was explicit, the reviewing court must uphold the
interpretation unless it is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary
200 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) ("The Administrator shall promulgate and revise as may be
appropriate .. ").
201 Id. § 9605(c) (1) ("Not later than 18 months after October 17, 1986, and after pub-
lication of notice and opportunity for submission of comments .... the President shall by
rule promulgate amendments to the hazard ranking system in effect on September 1,
1984.").
202 Id. § 9655 (a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, simultaneously with
promulgation or repromulgation of any rule or regulation .... the head of the depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality promulgating such rule or regulation shall transmit a
copy thereof....").
203 See supra text accompanying notes 146-50.
204 Chevron U.SA. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984).
205 Id.
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to the statute. '20 6 In contrast, if the delegation of authority was im-
plicit, the court must determine whether the agency's interpretation
rests on a "permissible"20 7 or a "reasonable"208 statutory construction.
Although some courts have followed this line of reasoning and
have discerned an operational difference between the two methods of
delegation,20 9 the majority of courts has disregarded this distinction,
focusing only on whether the interpretation had been "reason-
able."210 Because the potential delegation of authority in Kennecott
Utah Capper is implicit,211 a discussion of the distinction between the
two methods of delegation is beyond the scope of this Note. There-
fore, this Section discusses only the "reasonable" standard and its ap-
plication to the case.
In applying Chevron step two, the reviewing court must defer to an
agency interpretation if the interpretation is a reasonable construc-
tion of the statute. 212 The Supreme Court has recognized two general
rationales for this deference. First, as the Court suggested in Smiley v.
Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 213 if Congress has delegated authority to
the agency to administer a statute, it necessarily also has delegated
discretion to resolve any ambiguities: 214
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a
presumption that they drafted the provisions in question, or were
present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but
206 Id. at 843-44.
207 Id. at 843.
208 Id. at 844.
209 See, e.g., Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("[L]anguage in Chevron might be read to indicate that the appropriate standard of review
in such a situation varies to some degree dependent on whether the statute's delegation of
gap filling authority is explicit or implicit."); Panzarino v. Heckler, 624 F. Supp. 350, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that when "rulemaking authority... is only implicit, the scope of
our review is somewhat more searching than the 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute' standard").
210 See Anthony, supra note 136, at 30-31. Professor Anthony asserted that it is impor-
tant to keep this distinction clear to ensure that courts continue to ask whether Congress
has delegated authority to the agency to interpret the statute. Id.
211 See infra Part IV.
212 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984); see also Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), NA., 517 U.S. 735, 739 (1996) ("It is our practice
to defer to the reasonablejudgments of agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous
terms in statutes that they are charged with administering."); Nationsbank of N.C. v. Varia-
ble Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256 (1995) ("'It is settled that courts should give
great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency
charged with the enforcement of that statute.'" (quoting Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388, 403-04 (1987) (citation omitted))); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("The question.., is whether the
agency's interpretation is reasonable or permissible. If it is, the judiciary is obliged to defer
213 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
214 See, e.g., id. at 739-41.
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rather because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambigu-
ity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood
that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the
agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess
whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows. 21 5
The second rationale for deference under Chevron step two is that
administrative agencies possess the unique ability and expertise to rec-
oncile conflicting policy concerns when interpreting a statute.21 6 An
agency possesses unique knowledge of the content of the statute that
it administers and how differing interpretations would impact the con-
stituency to which the agency is accountable. As the Court stated in
Chevron, "[T]he principle of deference to administrative interpreta-
tions 'has been consistently followed... whenever [a] decision... has
involved reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of
the force of the statutory policy... has depended upon more than
ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency regu-
lations."' 217 Later in its analysis, the Chevron Court directly addressed
the role of the judiciary, stating that "[t] he responsibilities for assess-
ing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle be-
tween competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones."21 8
Chevron does not define directly when a statutory interpretation
satisfies the "reasonable" standard. Rather, the Court, and subsequent
authorities that have interpreted the decision, have not focused on
what "reasonable" means, but on what it does not mean. For example,
for an interpretation to be reasonable, it need not be the only inter-
215 Id. at 740-41 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44); see also Continental, 843 F.2d at
1454 ("Judicial deference is, after all, but a short-hand way of saying that the judiciary is
duty bound to respect the original choice of the political branches in vesting authority in
an agency to interpret and enforce a statute."). The Continental court continued, "To de-
part from the culture of deference... is to do violence to basic structural principles relied
upon by Congress and the President in creating the agency in the first instance and endow-
ing it with powers to interpret, administer and enforce that portion of the law of the land."
Id.
216 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 733 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45.
217 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
218 Id. at 866. In his dissent in Sweet Home, Justice Scalia explained:
We defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes pre-
cisely in order that agencies, rather than courts, may exercise policymaking
discretion in the interstices of statutes. Just as courts may not exercise an
agency's power to adjudicate, and so may not affirm an agency order on
discretionary grounds the agency has not advanced, so also this Court may
not exercise the Secretary's power to regulate, and so may not uphold a
regulation by adding to it even the most reasonable of elements it does not
contain.
Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also AL D C.
AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYroN, ADMINIS'RATIvE LAW § 13.7.2, at 469-70 (1993) ("Buttress-
ing the Chevron court's deferential approach ... was the fact that certain agencies are
connected to an electorally accountable branch of government-the executive.").
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pretation that the agency could have adopted, 219 or even the best
one.220 The interpretation, however, may not be wholly unsupport-
able22' or frustrate the policies that Congress intended to effectuate
through the statute. 222 By contrast, some courts and commentators
have defined "reasonable" in relation to the alternative "arbitrary and
capricious" standard proposed in Chevron,223 providing that an inter-
pretation is reasonable if it is neither arbitrary nor capricious. 224
Although these definitions provide some guidance, they inade-
quately define what a "reasonable" interpretation is. Black's Law Dic-
tionary provides a clear, but lengthy, definition of "reasonable," stating
in pertinent part: "[flair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the
circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view.., governed by
219 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; see also Anthony, supra note 136, at 27 ("To be
sustained as reasonable, the agency interpretation need not be the only permissible one[;]
... there need be no single true and enduring interpretation.").
220 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11; see also Smiley, 517 U.S. at 74445 ("Since we have
concluded that the Comptroller's regulation deserves deference, the question before us is
not whether it represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a
reasonable one."); Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 409 (1996) ("[Tlhe [agency]
... need not show that its construction is the best way to read the statute; rather, courts
must respect the [agency's] judgment so long as its reading is a reasonable one."); Bayside
Enters., Inc. v. NLRB, 429 U.S. 298, 304 (1977) (stating that the Court must accept the
agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute "regardless of how we might have resolved
the question as an initial matter"); Anthony, supra note 136, at 27 (asserting that "if reason-
able [the agency interpretation] will be upheld even though the court might have con-
strued the statute differently"); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative
Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 6 (1986) ("As long as an agency articulated a reasonable
construction, the courts may not say that some other construction would have been more
reasonable." (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 84445)).
221 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845 ("'[W] e should not disturb [the interpretation] unless
it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one that
Congress would have sanctioned.'" (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 383
(1961))); see also Smiley, 517 U.S. at 741 (stating that courts "deny deference 'to agency
litigating positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice'" (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988))); Conti-
nental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
("'[Courts] must reject administrative constructions of the statute, whether reached by
adjudication or by rulemaking, that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that
frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Federal Election Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 32
(1981))); Mikva, supra note 220, at 8 ("[T]he Court directs judges to reject administrative
constructions of a statute that are 'inconsistent with the statutory mandate or that frustrate
the policy that Congress sought to implement.'" (quoting Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 143 (1984))).
222 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845; see also Smiley, 517 U.S. at 742 (asserting that Chevron
excludes from deference interpretations that are "'manifestly contrary to the statute'");
Continental 843 F.2d at 1453 (discussing Federal Election Commission, and explaining that "an
agency interpretation did not meritjudicial approbation if it actually frustrated the policies
that Congress was seeking to effectuate").
223 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
224 See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 144, at 308.
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reason."2 25 For the sake of clarity, this Note proposes the following
definition, which attempts to incorporate aspects of each of the above
definitions: An agency interpretation is "reasonable," under Chevron
step two, if it is a feasible construction that has some basis in the statute
itself.226
It is equally unclear what method the reviewing court should use
to determine if an interpretation is reasonable. 22 7 The Supreme
Court's clearest statement on this issue came from Justice White in
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.228 In reviewing an inter-
pretation, the Court stated, "[O]ur review is limited to the question
whether it is reasonable, in light of the language, policies, and legisla-
tive history of the Act."229 Despite this statement, most of the deci-
sions and commentary on this issue have focused on one question-
whether the interpretation was reasonable in light of the statute's pur-
pose.230 The Kennecott Utah Copper court followed this approach.
Evaluating the interpretation in light of the purpose of the stat-
ute is a difficult task. Decisions and commentary are rife with warn-
ings against confining the inquiry to either the "broad purpose" of the
statute or the "narrow purpose" of the term or phrase that the agency
has interpreted. 23 1 Courts that warn against looking only at the
"broad purpose" of the statute stress that such an inquiry neglects vari-
ations in the statute that inevitably exist due to the political process. 2 32
As the Court stated in Board of Governors of the Federal Reseve System v.
Dimension Financial Corp.:2 33
225 BLACK'S LAW DIcIoNARY 1265 (6th ed. 1990).
226 The author recognizes that there are numerous definitions of "reasonable," with
each definition setting a slightly different standard for the interpretation. For example,
although each of the terms "possible," "probable," and "suitable" are adequate synonyms
for "reasonable," each places a different burden on the agency. In using "feasible," the
author attempts to select a term that fMlls in the middle of these disparate standards.
Although the author uses this term to evaluate the court's analysis in Kennecott Utah Cooper,
see infra text accompanying notes 256-77, the author does not mean to use the selection of
this term to resolve the debate surrounding the definition of "reasonable" or the applica-
tion of Chevron step two.
227 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2104.
228 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
229 Id. at 131; see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore-
gon, 515 U.S. 687, 696-704 (1995) (evaluating the interpretation of the term "harm" using
the text, structure, and legislative history of the Endangered Species Act).
230 See, e.g., infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text.
231 See, e.g., Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Nationsbank of N.C. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 262 (1995); Rodriguez v. United States, 480
U.S. 522, 526 (1987); Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474
U.S. 361, 373 (1986); Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444,
1449 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
232 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at 526; Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 373; Continenta4
843 F.2d at 1449.
233 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
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Application of "broad purposes" of legislation at the expense of spe-
cific provisions ignores the complexity of the problems Congress is
called upon to address and the dynamics of legislative action. Con-
gress may be unanimous in its intent to stamp out some vague social
or economic evil; however, because its Members may differ sharply
on the means for effectuating that intent, the final language of the
legislation may reflect hard-fought compromises. Invocation of the
"plain purpose" of legislation at the expense of the terms of the
statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and,
in the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent.
23 4
Courts that caution against looking only at the "narrow purpose" of
the specific term note that the meaning of a term is highly contex-
tual.235 They argue that courts can only interpret the purpose of a
term adequately in the context of the larger purpose of the statute
itself.2 36 In other words, in determining whether an agency's interpre-
tation is reasonable in light of the purpose of the statute, the court
often must weigh a host of competing purposes.23 7
In addition to determining the reasonableness of the interpreta-
tion in light of the language, policies, legislative history, and purpose
of the statute, courts generally consider several other factors in their
reasonableness analysis. For instance, courts frequently consider
whether the agency has provided a reasoned explanation for the inter-
,pretation. 238 Justice Stevens's' emphasis in Chevron on whether "the
234 Id. at 373-74; see also Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 726 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Deduction
from the 'broad purpose' of a statute begs the question if it is used to decide by what means
(and hence to what length) Congress pursued that purpose; to get the right answer...
there is no substitute for the hardjob... of reading the whole text."); sources cited supra
note 232.
235 See Nationsbank, 513 U.S. at 262.
236 See id. (stating that "a characterization fitting in certain contexts may be unsuitable
in others"). Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg quoted Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc.
v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932), stating that while the "'meaning [of words] well
may vary to meet the purposes of the law,' courts properly give words 'the meaning which
the legislature intended [they] should have in each instance.'" Id. (alterations in Nations-
bank). Justice Ginsburg also cited Professor Cook, who asserted that
"[t]he tendency to assume that a word which appears in two or more legal
rules, and so in connection with more than one purpose, has and should
have precisely the same scope in all of them, runs all through legal discus-
sions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must constantly be guarded
against."
Id. (quoting Walter Wheeler Cook, ."Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE LJ. 333, 337 (1933)).
237 See Continental, 843 F.2d at 1451.
238 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2104. Professor Sunstein drew parallels between this
inquiry and the inquiry into whether the agency's decision is "arbitrary" or "capricious"
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act. According to Professor Sunstein,
"That inquiry requires the agency to give a detailed explanation of its decision by reference
to factors that are relevant under the governing statute." Id. at 2105; see also Continental,
843 F.2d at 1451 (explaining that the nature of reasonableness-checking requires the
courts to evaluate whether the agency "consider[ed] ... meaningful alternatives" and pro-
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EPA had advanced a reasonable explanation for its conclusion" that
the interpretation had served the statutory purpose appears to have
introduced this factor.239 Requiring a reasoned explanation for the
interpretation is quite often a proxy for the court's underlying con-
cern that the agency "[had] acted with sufficient care and based its
decision on a consideration of relevant factors."240 Professor Anthony
provided an excellent summary of some of the other factors that have
led courts to conclude that an interpretation had been reasonable:
[F] actors ... that enhance reasonableness include the importance
of agency expertise in a technical or complex area .... the need to
reconcile conflicting policies, congressional grant to the agency of
explicit rulemaking authority, interpretation contemporaneous
with the agency's setting the statutory machinery into motion, con-
gressional awareness of the agency view and rejection of changes,
and the consistency with which the agency interpretation has been
applied.2 41
Other factors that might support a finding, of reasonableness are
whether the interpretation would produce absurd results, 242 whether
the interpretation would "raise constitutional questions,"243 whether
the agency employed "flawed . .. reasoning, '244 whether the agency
vided "a reasoned explication of the choice made" that "demonstrat[ed] a reasonable con-
nection between the facts found and the option selected" (internal quotation marks
omitted)); cf. Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("Although we do not necessarily require the agency to support its policy decision with
detailed cost calculations, neither is its decision made reasonable by the mere invocation of
a factor that might legitimately have been influential in a reasoned decisionmaking
process.").
239 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863
(1984).
240 Rettig, 744 F.2d at 152; see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting in support of the
determination of reasonableness that the agency, among other things, "considered the
matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion"); Silberman, supra note 34, at 828 (stating that
courts often ask themselves in Chevron step two analysis "whether the agency considered
and weighed the factors Congress wished the agency to bring to bear on its decision").
241 Anthony, supra note 136, at 29 (footnote omitted).
242 See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2116-17 (noting that the determination of absurdity
is "made by reference to traditional legal understandings").
243 Anthony, supra note 136, at 29 (citing DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg.
& Constr., 485 U.S. 568 (1988)).
244 Anthony, supra note 136, at 29-30 (citing Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832
F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987); Brock ex reL Williams v. Peabody Coal Co., 822 F.2d 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Brock v. Louvers & Dampers, Inc., 817 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1987); Phillips Petro-
leum Co. v. FERC, 792 F.2d 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
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positions are "inconsisten[t],"245 and whether the interpretation
would result in "agency self-aggrandizement." 46
Of course, for a court's inquiry to be truly deferential, it must not
be a full-fledged interpretation of the ambiguous term. 247 If the court
were to interpret the term de novo to determine the best interpreta-
tion, it effectively would assume the agency's role,248 which would con-
flict with the rationale behind granting deference to an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute.2 49 The court instead must evalu-
ate the interpretation in light of the factors discussed above to deter-
mine whether the interpretation is reasonable. 250
Commentators have criticized the uncertainty of Chevron step two,
particularly the courts' disparate definitions of reasonableness, the
quantity and diversity of factors that courts have used to determine
reasonableness, and the levels of scrutiny that they have applied to the
determination.2 51 These criticisms generally fall into three categories.
First, commentators have criticized the malleability of the step, argu-
ing that it has led to "unpredictable results."252 Former Judge Abner
J. Mikva of the D.C. Circuit stated that "[a]s a rule of the road, this
doctrine is inadequate because the drivers have no real assurance
245 Anthony, supra note 136, at 30 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446
n.30 (1987)). But see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64
The fact that the agency has from time to time changed its interpretation of
the term 'source' does not, as respondents argue, lead us to conclude that
no deference should be accorded the agency's interpretation of the statute.
An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the
contrary, the agency, to engage in informal rulemaking, must consider vary-
ing interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.
246 Anthony, supra note 136, at 30.
247 See id. at 28-29.
248 See Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1452 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (equating de novo review of agency interpretations with substantive policymak-
ing and denouncing it as "but another species of what a unanimous Supreme Court
roundly condemned in Vermont Yankee as 'judicial intervention run riot" (quoting Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 557
(1978))).
249 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-45. In Sweet Home, Justice Scalia explained:
We defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes pre-
cisely in order that agencies, rather than courts, may exercise policymaking
discretion in the interstices of statutes. Just as courts may not exercise an
agency's power to adjudicate, and so may not affirm an agency order on
discretionary grounds the agency has not advanced, so also this Court may
not exercise the Secretary's power to regulate, and so may not uphold a
regulation by adding to it even the most reasonable of elements it does not
contain.
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 733
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
250 See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
251 See, e.g., Mikva, supra note 220, at 9; Silberman, supra note 34, at 827-28; Endangered
Species Act Update, supra note 34, at 306.
252 Mikva, supra note 220, at 9.
1998] 1413
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
when or how it will be applied in any given case. '253 Second, com-
mentators have criticized the level of discretion that has been avail-
able to courts under Chevron step two, arguing that the wide range of
factors and definitions has placed courts in the agency role of poli-
cymaker.2 54 The third criticism builds on the second one, contending
that this wide discretion grants judges the opportunity either to accept
or to reject the agency's interpretations based largely on the judges'
personal or political beliefs about appropriate governmental policy.255
In Kennecott Utah Copper, the D.C. Circuit rejected Interior's inter-
pretation of section 113 (g) (1) (B), holding that the interpretation did
not satisfy Chevron step two because it was neither reasonable nor con-
sistent with the purpose of the statute. 256 Although the court briefly
discussed the legislative history of the statute of limitations provi-
sion 257 and the explanation that Interior had given for its interpreta-
tion,258 the court devoted the bulk of its discussion to its belief that
the interpretation was contrary to the purpose of statutes of limita-
tions in general. 259 The court's holding is improper under step two of
Chevron for two reasons: First, by failing to consider other factors, such
as the overall purpose of CERCLA and the meaning of "promulgated"
within the text and structure of section 113(g) (1) (B), the court con-
ducted an incomplete review of the interpretation. Second, in hold-
ing that the agency's interpretation was not reasonable, the court
rejected a feasible construction that had some basis in the statute
itself.260
In drafting the CERCLA legislation, Congress had three primary
concerns:261 First, Congress intended the legislation to "provide in-
centive[s] for maximum care in handling hazardous substances and
for minimizing the effects of any releases by establishing strict liability
for responsible parties for cleanup costs, mitigation, and third-party
damages." 262 Second, Congress intended to "provide a mechanism
for rapid response, including an immediately available source of fund-
ing for cleanup and mitigation, when hazardous substances are re-
253 Id.
254 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act Update, supra note 34, at 306 (stating that "[Chevron
step two] gives courts another opportunity to make policy decisions by interpolating their
own set of factors into the reasonableness test").
255 See, e.g., Silberman, supra note 34, at 827.
256 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1211 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
257 Id. at 1212.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 1211-12.
260 See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
261 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 11-12 (1980), reprinted in A LEGIsLATrWv HisTORy, supra
note 3, at 318-19.
262 Id. at 12, reprinted in A LEGISLATIV HIsToRY, supra note 3, at 319.
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leased into the environment. '263 Finally, Congress intended the
legislation to "provide prompt and adequate compensation for in-
jured parties."264 Because it drafted the legislation in response to the
discovery of hazardous waste dump sites such as Love Canal, Cedar
River, and Valley of the Drums, Congress primarily intended for CER-
CLA to serve as a remedial statute to remedy the wrongs of offending
parties and to provide redress to victims. 265 Congress intended the
costs of these remedies to fall on the offending parties regardless of
the intent behind their actions. 266
As discussed above, courts must consider the purpose of a statute
when determining whether an agency's interpretation of a term is rea-
sonable.267 This consideration is particularly important when the stat-
ute is remedial in nature. As the D.C. Circuit explained in a 1984 case
involving ERISA, "One principle of statutory construction teaches...
that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed to effectuate their
purposes. '268 Courts have applied this principle to CERCLA in the
past, as the following statement from a district court evidences: "To
give effect to... congressional concerns, CERCLA should be given a
broad and liberal construction. The statute should not be narrowly
interpreted to frustrate the government's ability to respond promptly,
or to limit the liability of those responsible for cleanup costs beyond
the limits expressly provided."269 In practice, arguably the natural re-
source damages provisions themselves are not entirely remedial, given
the obvious impossibility of restoring natural resources to their pris-
tine state following a release of hazardous substances. Nevertheless,
the provisions' focus on restoration and replacement indicates that
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
266 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 13, reprinted in A LEGISLAT=W HisTORY, supra note 3, at 320
("To establish provisions of liability any less than strict, joint, and several liability would be
to condone a system in which innocent victims bear the actual burden of releases, while
those who conduct commerce in hazardous substances which cause such damage benefit
with relative impunity."); id. at 34 ("In some... cases the choice is not between an inno-
cent victim and a careless defendant, but between two blameless parties. In such cases the
costs should be borne by the one of the two innocent parties whose acts instigated or made
the harm possible."); see also United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985)
("In enacting CERCLA in 1980, Congress sought to... impose the costs and responsibility
for remedial action upon the persons responsible for the creation of the hazardous waste
disposal threat."); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982) ("Congress intended that those responsible for problems caused by the dispo-
sal of chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedying the harmful condi-
tions they created.").
267 See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text.
268 Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
269 Reilly Tar& Chem., 546 F. Supp. at 1112; see also Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. at902 ("[T]he
remedial intent of CERCIA requires a liberal statutory construction designed to avoid frus-
tration of the Act's purpose.").
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Congress intended that they be consistent with the remedial nature of
the greater statute.2 70
By interpreting "promulgated" to include dates on which agen-
cies had filed amendments or revisions to initial regulations, Interior
has expanded the statute of limitations period. This expansion en-
ables the government to impose liability on offending parties under
revised legislation. Although this interpretation adds to offending
parties' uncertainty by tolling the statute of limitations, it is nonethe-
less consistent with CERCLA's purpose-to restore dangerous sites
and impose liability on responsible parties. 271 By failing to consider
the purpose of CERCLA in making its Chevron step two determination,
the Kennecott Utah Copper court overlooked an important factor that
favored a determination of reasonableness.
In addition, the Kennecott Utah Copper court failed to consider the
ambiguity of the term "promulgated." As discussed above, Interior's
interpretation had been one of many possible interpretations of sec-
tion 113(g) (1) (B).272 In fact, a recent Course of Study that the Amer-
ican Law Institute, the American Bar Association, and the
Environmental Law Institute co-sponsored specifically recognized that
the date that Interior had issued revised regulations in response to the
decision in Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior was only one of
several possible dates on which the natural resource damage assess-
ment regulations could have been promulgated for purposes of the
statute of limitations.2 73 By failing to consider the ambiguity of the
language in section 113(g) (1) (B), the Kennecott Utah Copper court ne-
glected to consider another factor in favor of reasonableness.
Even if one were to focus on only the factors that the court had
considered in making its determination, one would not conclude in-
evitably that Interior's interpretation had been unreasonable. The
court was correct in asserting that Interior's interpretation would toll
the statute of limitations significantly and extend the liability and un-
certainty of offending parties that already have responded to the stat-
ute. 274 This interpretation certainly would conflict with the purpose
of statutes of limitations to provide finality and grant repose to the
parties. The Supreme Court, however, has held consistently that
when parties seek to interpret statutes of limitations provisions to de-
feat government rights, courts should construe the provisions strictly
270 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
271 See supra text accompanying notes 7-14.
272 See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
273 Thomas H. Milch & Michael D. Daneker, Key Issues in Natural Resource Damages,
C948 A.L.I.-A.B-A. COURSE OF STUDY 715, 728-30 (1994).
274 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1211-12 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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in the government's favor. 275 As the United States District Court for
the District of New Hampshire stated in a case involving CERCLA,
"Where, as here, defendants' proposed construction would operate to
bar actions for cost reimbursement under CERCLA by the United
States and state governments more than three years after cost incur-
rence, [the statute] must be strictly construed in favor of the federal
and state governments." 276 Interior's interpretation of section
113(g) (1) (B) was consistent with this approach. By failing to consider
this well-established principle of statutory construction, the Kennecott
Utah Copper court conducted an incomplete assessment of the reasona-
bleness of Interior's interpretation.
Furthermore, it is clear that Interior provided a reasoned expla-
nation of its interpretation, even if the court did not conclude that it
was the best interpretation.277 Although this Note recognizes that In-
terior's interpretation of "promulgated" may not be the best interpre-
tation under section 113(g) (1) (B), such a determination is beyond
the bounds of Chevron step two analysis. Rather, the question is
whether Interior presented a reasonable interpretation-one that was
feasible and had some basis in the statute. For the reasons discussed
above, Interior presented a reasonable interpretation of the statute.
Therefore, the Kennecott Utah Copper court erred in holding that 43
C.F.R. § 11.91(e) was invalid under Chevron step two.
IV
THE COURT'S ASSUMPTION: INTERIOR'S AunrHORTY TO
DEFINE "PROMULGATED"
The previous two parts of this Note determined that Interior's
interpretation of "promulgated" within the statute of limitations pro-
visions of CERCLA was acceptable under both steps of Chevron. As a
result, the Kennecott Utah Copper court erred in holding that 43 C.F.R.
§ 11.91(e) was invalid under Chevron. This determination, however,
does not end the inquiry into the overall validity of Interior's interpre-
tation. In order for the interpretation's validity under Chevron to be
dispositive, the interpretation must be entitled to Chevron deference.
As the Supreme Court stated in Adam Fruit Co. v. Barrett,278 "A
precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional delega-
275 See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 391 (1984); Lucas v. Pilliod Lumber
Co., 281 U.S. 245, 249 (1930); E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co. v. Davis, 264 U.S. 456, 462
(1924).
276 United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985).
277 See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1212 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
278 494 U.S. 638 (1990).
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tion of administrative authority."279 Therefore, in determining the va-
lidity of an agency interpretation, courts can only grant deference if
Congress has delegated authority to the agency to render such an in-
terpretation.280 The remainder of this Note addresses the question
that the Kennecott Utah Copper court left unresolved 2 81-whether Inte-
rior's interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference.
Although agency interpretations are commonplace in modem
administrative law, courts and commentators have debated their valid-
ity for centuries. When an agency interprets a statute, it necessarily
defines the law at issue. When a court defers to an agency's interpre-
tation, rather than conducting an independent review of the statute, it
implicitly acknowledges that the agency has the authority to define
the law. This acknowledgment is problematic for two reasons. First,
one could read the United States Constitution to prohibit courts from
granting this deference. 2 2 Article III of the Constitution states that
the 'Judicial power of the United States" is vested in the courts.283 A
strict reading of this provision indicates that courts alone have the
power to interpret the law.28 4 ChiefJustice Marshall adopted this read-
ing in Marbury v. Madison28 5 when he stated that it was "emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is."286 Second, if the Framers did grant the courts the power to inter-
pret the law, the maxim delegata potestas non potest delegari prevents the
delegation of this power to administrative agencies.28 7 This maxim,
which also is known as the nondelegation doctrine, asserts that "[a]
delegated power cannot be delegated."288 The combination of these
two principles-the strict reading of Article III and the nondelegation
279 Id. at 649 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988)).
Similarly, in Kelley v. EPA, 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the D.C. Circuit explained that
Chevron... is premised on the notion that Congress implicitly delegated to
the agency the authority to reconcile reasonably statutory ambiguities or to
fill reasonably statutory interstices. Where Congress does not give an
agency authority to determine... the interpretation of a statute in the first
instance .... deference to the agency's interpretation is inappropriate.
Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1108 (citing United States v. Western Elec. Co., 900 F.2d 283, 297 (D.C.
Cir. 1990)).
280 See, e.g., Adams Fruit, 494 U.S. at 649; Bowen, 488 U.S. at 208; NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987).
281 See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
282 See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State 133 U. PA. L. REV.
549, 569 (1985).
283 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
284 See Diver, supra note 282, at 569; Scalia, supra note 34, at 513-14; Start, supra note
34, at 283.
285 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
286 Id. at 177.
287 See Diver, supra note 282, at 569.
288 Id. at 569 n.140; see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 452, 478-80 (1989) (discussing the con-
stitutional basis for, and the decline of, the nondelegation doctrine).
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doctrine-dictates that courts must conduct an independent review of
all statutes. 2 89
Over the last two centuries, however, the development of admin-
istrative law has departed from these two principles.290 As Professor
Cynthia Farina stated, "The size and power of the contemporary ad-
ministrative state became doctrinally possible because the Supreme
Court's view of the scope and purpose of constitutional restraints on
delegation evolved considerably during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries."291 Accompanying this development has come
the acknowledgment that "courts do not necessarily abdicate a Mar-
shallian duty to 'say what the law is' by deferring to agencies" because
courts retain the authority to invalidate unreasonable interpreta-
tions.2 92 Nevertheless, concerns about the concepts of separation of
powers and nondelegation endure.2 93 As a result, the scope and ap-
plication of the deference doctrine reflect these ongoing tensions.294
Prior to Chevron, courts had grappled with the deference doctrine
on a case-by-case basis.295 In each individual case, the court struggled
to determine whether deference was appropriate, often producing in-
consistent results.2 96 A primary component of this determination has
involved a consideration of the appropriate allocation of interpretive
authority between agencies and courts.2 97 As Professor Farina
explained:
For those who study the interaction of courts and agencies, one
of the most persistently intriguing puzzles has been to define the
appropriate judicial and administrative roles in the interpretation of
regulatory statutes....
289 See Diver, supra note 282, at 569.
290 See id.
291 Farina, supra note 288, at 479.
292 Diver, supra note 282, at 569.
293 See, e.g., Starr, supra note 34, at 283.
294 See id. Starr explained that
[j]udicial deference to agencies' statutory interpretations thus constitutes a
continuing source of tension for judges because it necessarily means that an
agency of the executive branch, to a greater or lesser degree, is displacing
the judiciary in its traditional andjealously guarded law-declaring function.
Largely because of this tension between the judiciary's law-declaring func-
tion and the need to defer to congressional delegation, application of the
deference doctrine in the federal courts has been rather erratic.
Id. (citation omitted).
295 See Maureen B. Callahan, Must Federal Courts Defer to Agency Interpretations of Statutes?:
A NewDoctrinalBasisforChevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1275, 1276, 1278-79.
296 See Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv.
363, 365 (1986); Starr, supra note 34, at 292-93.
297 See Diver, supra note 282, at 551.
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Judicial attempts, over the years, to cut through this conceptual
complexity have produced a large number of statutory interpreta-
tion opinions that defy easy reconciliation.2 98
Nevertheless, despite these inconsistencies, the pre-Chevron cases gen-
erally reflect two distinct and competing responses by the courts.
299
Courts that adopted the first response, which Professor Thomas
Merrill appropriately termed the "'deference' mode,"3 00 concluded
that the agency had the primary responsibility for interpreting the
statute.8 0 ' Under this first response, courts focused merely on
whether the agency's interpretation was reasonable, and thus did not
contradict the text or language of the statute.30 2 The Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc.30 3 is a commonly
cited example of the "deference mode."3 0 4 In this case, the Court up-
held, pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act,30 5 the NLRB's de-
cision that certain newspaper distributors were "employees."3 0 6
Although the Court prefaced its discussion by stating that "questions
of statutory interpretation . . . are for the courts to resolve,"30 7 the
Court concluded that the agency should resolve more specific inter-
pretations.30 8 The Court wrote, "[W] here the question is one of spe-
cific application of a broad statutory term in a proceeding in which
the agency administering the statute must determine it initially, the
reviewing court's function is limited."3 0 9 In these cases, courts should
accept agency interpretations if they are "warrant[ed] in the record"
and have "a reasonable basis in law."13 10
In stark contrast, courts that adopted the second response, which
Professor Merrill termed the "independent judgment mode,"311
298 Farina, supra note 288, at 452-53.
299 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 365-67; Callahan, supra note 295, at 1278; Diver, supra
note 282, at 551; Farina, supra note 288, at 452-54; Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to
Executive Precedent; 101 YALE LJ. 969, 971-72 (1992); Starr, supra note 34, at 292-93.
300 Merrill, supra note 299, at 971.
301 See Farina, supra note 288, at 454; see also Diver, supra note 282, at 551 ("This tradi-
tion views agencies as delegates, empowered by the legislature to exercise legislative power
to articulate and implement public goals.").
302 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 366; Callahan, supra note 295, at 1279; Diver, supra
note 282, at 566; Farina, supra note 288, at 454; Merrill, supra note 299, at 971; Starr, supra
note 34, at 292.
303 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
304 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 296, at 366-67; Callahan, supra note 295, at 1279.
305 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
306 Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. at 131-32.
307 Id. at 130-31.
308 Id. at 131.
309 Id.; see also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("When faced with a problem of
statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.").
310 Hearst, 322 U.S. at 131 (internal quotation marks omitted).
311 Merrill, supra note 299, at 971 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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granted no deference to agency interpretations and interpreted the
statutes de novo.312 In making an interpretation, a reviewing court
employed traditional tools of statutory construction-such as legisla-
tive history, textual analysis, and the like-to reach what it concluded
was the best interpretation of the statute. 313 Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB,3 14 in which the Court upheld the NLRB's decision that shop
foremen were "employees" under the National Labor Relations Act,315
is a commonly cited example of the "independent judgment
mode."3 16 Rather than determine whether the agency's decision had
"a reasonable basis in law," as the Hearst Court had done when faced
with similar facts three years earlier,3 17 the Court interpreted the term
"employees" de novo. 318 In other words, "the majority and the dis-
senters each made their own legal analysis; neither suggested the
agency's decision should receive any special weight or deference; and
neither referred either to Hearst or to any of the cases on which Hearst
relied."319
The rationales supporting "independent judgment mode" deci-
sions such as Packard are sensible given the approach's historical basis
in Article HI and the nondelegation doctrine.3 20 The more interest-
ing question is why a court should ever adopt the "deference mode"
and grant weight to an agency's interpretation of the law.3 2 1 The key
element of this inquiry is a determination of whether Congress has
granted the agency authority to interpret the statute.
Courts and commentators have offered three rationales for grant-
ing deference to agency interpretations. Two of the rationales assert,
for different reasons, that courts should exercise deference because
agencies are better suited to interpret the laws that they promulgate.
In other words, the agency has implied authority to make the interpre-
tations because it has more expertise in the specific area. The third
312 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 366-67; Callahan, supra note 295, at 1279-80; Diver,
supra note 282, at 551; Farina, supra note 288, at 453-54; Merrill, supra note 299, at 971;
Starr, supra note 34, at 293.
313 See Farina, supra note 288, at 453-54; Merrill, supra note 299, at 971-72.
314 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
315 Id. at 489-90.
316 See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 296, at 366-67; Callahan, supra note 295, at 1279-80.
Scholars often use Hearst and Packard to contrast the two approaches because of their obvi-
ous similarities in facts, governing statute, and parties.
317 See supra text accompanying note 310.
318 Packard Motor Car, 330 U.S. at 488-90; see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166
(1970) ("[S]ince the only or principal dispute relates to the meaning of [a] statutory term,
the controversy must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special
competence of the [agency], but by judicial application of canons of statutory
construction.").
319 Breyer, supra note 296, at 366-67.
320 See supra text accompanying notes 282-89.
321 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 368.
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rationale points to the intent of Congress, asserting that courts should
defer to agency interpretations simply because Congress intended that
the agency interpret the statute. The following discussion addresses
each of these points.
The first rationale asserts that courts should defer to agency inter-
pretations because the agency possesses unique "expertise" in inter-
preting the statute.322 Because an agency's operations revolve around
the statute that it administers, the agency is presumably more familiar
with the history and purpose of the statute.3 23 The agency also has a
thorough understanding of the language of the statute, including how
the statute's provisions interrelate and how different interpretations
would affect relevant parties.324 Because the generalist judiciary does
not share this expertise, courts should defer to the agency because it is
more likely to reach the correct result.3 2 5 In the context of a particu-
lar case, several factors can strengthen this first rationale. If, for ex-
ample, a statute at issue is especially complex or imprecise, deferring
to the agency's expertise is particularly warranted. 326 Conversely, if
the agency has wavered in its past interpretation of the relevant provi-
sion, then its expertise is more dubious and judicial deference is less
likely.3 27
The second rationale asserts that agencies are better suited to in-
terpret statutes because they are, indirectly at least, accountable to the
electorate. 328 This rationale stems from the following three argu-
ments. First, when interpreting a statute, the interpreting entity inevi-
tably must consider policy in reaching its decision.329 As Professor
Colin Diver observed, statutory interpretation is a "component in the
larger process by which social policy, as embodied in the statute as a
whole, is implemented."330 Second, under a democratic system, enti-
322 See id.; Farina, supra note 288, at 466; RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The Role of theJudidary in
Implementing an Agency Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 1239, 1251 (1989); Scalia,
supra note 34, at 514; Starr, supra note 34, at 309-10.
323 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 514.
324 See Starr, supra note 34, at 309-10.
325 See Scalia, supra note 34, at 514; Starr, supra note 34, at 309-10.
326 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 370-71; Scalia, supra note 34, at 513; see also Starr,
supra note 34, at 309-10 ("Many regulatory statutes, particularly those enacted in the 1960's
and since, are highly complex.").
327 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 368 (stating that "courts have said they find an
agency's views more persuasive when they reflect a longstanding, consistent interpretation
of the statute").
328 See Diver, supra note 282, at 593; Farina, supra note 288, at 466; Pierce, supra note
322, at 1240, 1251; Scalia, supra note 34, at 515.
329 See Diver, supra note 282, at 593 (asserting that "interpretation is inherently a form
of policymaking"); Farina, supra note 288, at 467 (asserting that policy choices are "una-
voidable in construing contemporary regulatory statutes").
330 Diver, supra note 282, at 585.
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ties that are politically accountable should make policyjudgments.3 3l
Finally, due to the underlying functions of agencies and courts, agen-
cies are significantly more accountable to the electorate than are
courts.33 2 The judiciary's function as enforcer of the law necessitates
its independence from the President, Congress, and the people.333
Once federal judges are confirmed, they cannot face removal from
office merely because their policy decisions fail to reflect the consen-
sus of the electorate.33 4 By contrast, agency personnel serve at the
pleasure of the President, who can remove them from office if their
decisions are politically unpopular.335 Accordingly, the enhancement
of this "political accountability" rationale will occur in a particular
case if consideration of policy is a critical component of the interpre-
tation at issue.
The third and final rationale for granting deference to an agency
interpretation is congressional intent.3 36 When it drafts a statute,
Congress either explicitly or implicitly delegates to the agency the
power to decide the relevant question of law. Therefore, to satisfy
congressional intent, the court must consider the agency's interpreta-
tion. When this delegation is explicit, the question of deference gen-
erally is not at issue. When Congress implicitly delegates authority to
interpret the statute, however, the court must consider a variety of
factors to determine congressional intent.3 3 7 Justice (then Judge)
Breyer provided a helpful summation of these factors:
[Courts] look[ ] to practical features of the particular circumstance
to decide whether it "makes sense...... to imply a congressional
intent that courts defer to the agency's interpretation.... [C] ourts
will defer more when the agency has special expertise that it can
bring to bear on the legal question. Is the particular question one
that the agency or the court is more likely to answer correctly? ... A
court may also ask whether the legal question is an important one.
Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and answered, major
questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer themselves in
the course of the statute's daily administration. A court may also
look to see whether the language is "inherently imprecise," i.e.,
whether the words of the statute are phrased so broadly as to invite
agency interpretation. It might also consider the extent to which
331 See Pierce, supra note 322, at 1240; Scalia, supra note 34, at 515; see also Farina, supra
note 288, at 467 (indicating despite her subsequent criticism, that the political accountabil-
ity rationale "echoes the Lockean view that the exercise of power in a democratic govern-
ment can be defended only through accountability to its source, the electorate").
332 See Pierce, supra note 322, at 1240, 1251.
333 See id. at 1241.
334 See id. at 1251.
335 See id.
336 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 370-71; Scalia, supra note 34, at 516.'
337 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 370-71; Scalia, supra note 34, at 516.
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the answer to the legal question will clarify, illuminate or stabilize a
broad area of the law.338
Of course, statutory language, legislative history, or other evidence in-
dicating that Congress intended for courts to resolve the statutory
question at issue can outweigh these factors easily.33 9
Chevron had appeared to end courts' case-by-case struggles with
the deference doctrine. 340 On its face, Chevron had seemed to advo-
cate a blanket presumption that deference to agency interpretations
was required when a statute was ambiguous.34 In the fourteen years
since the Chevron decision, however, it has become apparent that the
Court does not consider Chevron analysis to be the universal test for
granting deference. 342 As Professor Thomas Merrill noted in 1992,
"[T] he Chevron framework is used in only about half the cases that the
Court perceives as presenting a deference question."343
Furthermore, the aforementioned rationales and related factors
that support deference have not disappeared in the post-Chevron pe-
riod.344 On the contrary, the Chevron decision itself incorporates as-
pects of all three rationales. 345 In particular, Justice Stevens relied on
the "political accountability" rationale when he wrote for the majority:
338 Breyer, supra note 296, at 370-71 (citations omitted). Although Justice Scalia ac-
knowledged the agency expertise and political accountability rationales, he argued that the
only acceptable justification for the deference mode was congressional intent. Scalia, supra
note 34, at 514-15. In discussing implied intent, he argued that "the relevance of such
frequently mentioned factors as the degree of the agency's expertise, the complexity of the
question at issue, and the existence of rulemaking authority within the agency... make an
intent to confer discretion upon the agency more likely." Id. at 516.
339 See Breyer, supra note 296, at 371.
340 See Callahan, supra note 295, at 1281; Farina, supra note 288, at 455; Scalia, supra
note 34, at 512.
341 See Callahan, supra note 295, at 1281; Merrill, supra note 299, at 969; Scalia, supra
note 34, at 516. But see Breyer, supra note 296, at 373 ("To read Chevron as laying down a
blanket rule, applicable to all agency interpretations of law, such as 'always defer to the
agency when the statute is silent,' would be seriously overbroad, counterproductive and
sometimes senseless.").
342 See Merrill, supra note 299, at 970. Professor Merrill points to several factors indi-
cating that the Chevron Court "did not regard [its decision] as a departure from prior law."
Id. at 976. For example, only six Justices participated, the opinion did not include any
concurring or dissenting statements, "[a]nd in the year following Chevron, the Court de-
cided nineteen cases involving deference issues, but applied the Chevron framework only
once." Id. at 975-76.
343 Id. at 970.
344 See id.; see also Scalia, supra note 34, at 521 ("The opinions we federal judges read,
and the cases we cite, are full of references to the old criteria of 'agency expertise,' 'the
technical and complex nature of the question presented,' [and] 'the consistent and long-
standing agency position' ..... ).
345 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (invoking the "agency expertise" rationale and stating that "the principle of defer-
ence to administrative interpretations 'has been consistently followed by this Court when-
ever.., a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the given situation has
depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected to agency
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When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory pro-
vision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the
agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within
a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case,
federal judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.346
Following Chevron, cases and commentary that address the defer-
ence issue indicate that courts have continued to make case-by-case
determinations of deference. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,34 7 the Court
invoked aspects of the expertise rationale to conclude that the Board
of Immigration Appeals' construction of the Refugee Act of 1980348
was not entitled to Chevron deference.3 4 9 The Court reasoned that the
interpretation was "a pure question of statutory construction."35 0 It
differentiated between two kinds of interpretive problems, stating that
"[t] he narrow legal question whether the two standards are the same
is, of course, quite different from the question of interpretation that
arises in each case in which the agency is required to apply either or
both standards to a particular set of facts."351 In other words, rather
than granting Chevron deference to the agency's interpretation, the
Court reasoned that the judiciary was better suited than the agency to
make the interpretation at issue. The Court added, in a footnote, that
the interpretation also was not entitled to deference because the
agency's past interpretations of the provision had been inconsis-
tent.3 52 As previously discussed, courts are likely to decline deference
in these situations on the ground that the agency's expertise in the
area is questionable. 353
The Court's more recent decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter
of Communities for a Great Oregon3 54 also reflects this case-by-case ap-
proach. As part of this highly controversial decision, the Court held
that, under Chevron, it should defer to the Secretary of the Interior's
regulations'" (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961))); id. at 843-44
(reviewing the differences between explicit and implicit delegations of agency authority);
see also Callahan, supra note 295, at 1281-82 (discussing the various rationales apparent in
Chevron).
346 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 866.
347 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
348 Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. (1994)).
349 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446-48; see also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 322 (1988) (ScaliaJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[O]ne of the most
important reasons we defer to an agency's construction of a statute [is] .. .its expert
knowledge of the interpretation's practical consequences.").
350 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446.
351 Id. at 448.
352 Id. at 446-47 n.30.
353 See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
354 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
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interpretation under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA") 3 55
of when an endangered or threatened species has been "take [n]."356
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reasoned that "[t]he latitude
the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute, together with the
degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement, estab-
lishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reason-
able interpretation."357 The Court's reliance on the agency expertise
rationale is clearly apparent in this passage. Furthermore, in pointing
to the latitude that the statute granted the agency in enforcing the
ESA, the Court also appeared to invoke the congressional intent ra-
tionale by inferring that Congress had intended the agency to resolve
these questions.
Thus, it appears that there is no clear standard for determining
when courts should defer to agency interpretations. Rather, at a mini-
mum, Chevron stands for the proposition that when the aforemen-
tioned rationales and factors suggest that deference "makes sense" in
a particular case, then deference is appropriate.358 Justice Breyer pro-
vided an insightful prediction of the current predicament eleven years
ago when he forecast the following:
Inevitably, one suspects, we will find the courts actually following
more varied approaches, sometimes deferring to agency interpreta-
dons, sometimes not, depending upon the statute, the question, the
context, and what "makes sense" in the particular litigation, in light
of the basic statute and its purposes. No particular, or single simple
judicial formula can capture or take into account the varying re-
sponses, called for by different circumstances, and the need to pro-
mote a "proper," harmonious, effective or workable agency-court
relationship.35 9
Returning to the Kennecott Utah Copper decision, the appropriate
question is whether Interior's interpretation of the statute of limita-
tions provision in section l13 (g) (1) (B) is entitled to Chevron defer-
ence. As discussed previously, the D.C. Circuit "assume[d] without
deciding" that the interpretation was entitled to this deference. 360
The necessary inquiry, therefore, is whether, in light of the above ra-
tionales and factors, Interior has the authority to make such an inter-
pretation. Although there are valid arguments on each side of the
355 Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16
U.S.C. (1994)).
356 Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703.
357 Id.
358 Breyer, supra note 296, at 381 (internal quotation marks omitted).
359 Id.
360 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191,
1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
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inquiry, the balance of factors indicates that the interpretation is not
entitled to Chevron deference.
With respect to the agency expertise rationale, a determination of
the meaning of "promulgated" in the statute of limitations provision
does not require any technical expertise or special knowledge. As the
Third Circuit stated in Bamidele v. INS,3 61 which this circuit decided
shortly after the Kennecott Utah Copper decision, "A statute of limita-
tons is not a matter within the particular expertise of the
[agency]."362 Although the Bamidele court acknowledged that the
agency's interpretations of the statute generally were entitled to con-
siderable deference, the court declined to extend this deference to a
statute of limitations provision.363 The court reasoned that such an
interpretation was "'a clearly legal issue that courts are better
equipped to handle."'3 64 This reasoning is applicable to Kennecott
Utah Copper. As administrator of the natural resource damages provi-
sions of CERCLA, Interior certainly has considerable expertise in the
language, purpose, and history of CERCLA. If the interpretation at
issue had involved a discrete technical provision of this complicated
statute, deference certainly would have been more appropriate.365
The interpretation, however, focuses solely on the meaning of a legal
term that commonly appears in many statutes of limitations. In this
context, the agency is not better situated than the court to make the
interpretation. Therefore, Chevron deference is not appropriate in
this instance.
Under the political accountability rationale, the balance shifts
slightly in favor of granting deference. Although the interpretation
primarily involves a consideration of statutory language and history,
the purpose of CERCLA plays a considerable part in the interpreta-
tion.366 To determine the meaning of "promulgated," the interpret-
ing entity must consider the policies underlying the statute and how
each interpretation would affect these policies. For example, the en-
tity must consider the impact that its interpretation would have on the
environment and on the liability of polluters, as well as other relevant
policy considerations.367 As a result, the political accountability ra-
361 99 F.3d 557 (3d Cir. 1996).
362 Id. at 561.
363 Id.
364 Id. (quoting Dion v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 669, 673 (1st
Cir. 1987)) (citing Lynch v. Lyng, 872 F.2d 718, 724 (6th Cir. 1989); In re Oliver M. Elam,
Jr., Co., 771 F.2d 174, 181 (6th Cir. 1985)).
365 See id. at 562.
366 See supra text accompanying notes 267-70. Although this Section addresses the
"reasonableness" of the agency's interpretation, a similar consideration would take place
when interpreting the provision de novo.
367 See S. REP. No. 96-848, at 12 (1980), reprinted in A LEGIsLATIrvE HisroRy, supra note
3, at 319.
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tionale supports a granting of Chevron deference to the agency
interpretation.
Finally, concerning congressional intent, the balance shifts back
in favor of independent judicial review of the statute. There is little
evidence in the statute or elsewhere that Congress intended the
agency to interpret the statute of limitations provision: First, although
the clarity of "promulgated" does not satisfy Chevron step one inquiry,
the ambiguity is not extreme enough to support an implication that
Congress invited agency interpretation. 368 Second, because the
agency does not have special expertise in interpreting statutes of limi-
tations, one cannot assume, on expertise grounds, that Congress in-
tended the agency to address this issue. 369 Finally, the date on which
the statute of limitations begins to run is a significant matter within a
remedial statute such as CERCLA. It is unlikely, therefore, that Con-
gress intentionally left a gap in this area for the agency to resolve in its
daily administration.
In conclusion, the Kennecott Utah Copper court erred in assuming
that Interior's interpretation of "promulgated" within CERCLA's stat-
ute of limitations provisions was entitled to Chevron deference. The
aforementioned rationales and factors indicate that, despite Interior's
authority to interpret other technical provisions of the statute, the
agency did not have the authority to define CERCLA's statute of limi-
tations provisions. As a result, the court's application of Chevron to the
instant case, however flawed, was moot. The court should have con-
ducted an independent review of the statute to determine the mean-
ing of "promulgated" within section 113 (g) (1) (B).
CONCLUSION
In invalidating 43 C.F.R. § 11.91(e), the Kennecott Utah Copper
court reached the correct result. At the same time, however, the court
erred in its analysis. As a threshold matter, the court failed to address
the most important issue in the case-whether Interior had the au-
thority to interpret section 113(g) (1) (B) of CERCLA. In applying
Chevron step one, the court conducted a cursory and, arguably, inade-
quate review of the statute. The court extended this level of review
into its Chevron step two analysis. In applying this step, the court fo-
cused exclusively on a handful of factors that supported a conclusion
of unreasonableness and neglected several factors that supported a
contrary conclusion.
The Kennecott Utah Copper decision is an excellent example of the
deficiencies of the Chevron test for statutory interpretation. As dis-
368 See supra Part II.
369 See supra text accompanying notes 361-63.
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cussed earlier in Parts III and IV, the test contains numerous ambigui-
ties that courts have interpreted in various ways. These ambiguities
enable courts to craft the application of the Chevron test to reach a
pre-determined conclusion. In some cases, this malleability suggests
that a decision may reflect a court's biases and tendencies instead of
the merits of the particular controversy. When the controversy at is-
sue involves a statute that, like CERCLA, has been a source of public
and political attention since its inception, the risk that courts will ex-
ploit such malleability is severe. This action has the potential to im-
pact environmental policy greatly in this nation, affecting both the
liability of polluters and the extent to which natural resource damages
are recoverable.
Because Interior's interpretation was not entitled to Chevron def-
erence, the Kennecott Utah Copper court nevertheless reached the cor-
rect result in invalidating 43 C.F.R. § 11.91 (e). Whether the decision
resulted from judicial bias or flawed application, however, the District
of Columbia Circuit conducted a deficient analysis of Interior's inter-
pretation of "promulgated" within CERCLA's statute of limitations
provisions.
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